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APPLYING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION TO 
FOREIGN ASYLUM SEEKERS: EXPOSING A 
CURIOUS, INCONSISTENT PRACTICE IN 
THE FEDERAL COURTS 
SHALINI BHARGAVA RAY* 
Asylum law is based on an international treaty, but federal courts routinely 
invoke U.S. constitutional norms in adjudicating asylum claims.  Specifically, 
they rely on constitutional norms when gauging whether an asylum applicant 
has suffered harm amounting to “persecution” and whether the harm was in-
flicted “on account of” a protected characteristic, such as political opinion or 
religion.  In a close analysis of this unusual practice, this Article argues that 
federal courts have come to inconsistent, and often incompatible, conclusions 
regarding the use of constitutional norms in the analysis of asylum claims: prin-
cipally, on whether constitutional norms establish sufficient, insufficient, nec-
essary, or unnecessary conditions for qualifying for asylum.  In addition to ex-
posing these inconsistencies, this Article offers insights into improving the 
current practice of using constitutional norms in deciding asylum cases.  Ulti-
mately, this Article seeks to start a larger discussion of the diverse roles of 
constitutional law in asylum law and of the relationship between U.S. constitu-
tional law and international human rights law—what it is and what it should 
be. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Constitution does not apply to foreign nations’ treatment of their 
own citizens, but it nonetheless plays a special role in asylum cases, a role that 
has not been adequately explained or appreciated to date.  Two stories illustrate 
the central role of the U.S. Constitution in this context.  The first story involves 
the plight of a man named Chang.1  In the late 1980s, Chang lived in the Chinese 
countryside.2  He and his wife had two children, but they wanted a bigger fam-
ily.3  When China adopted the one-couple, one-child policy, and the govern-
ment told Chang to report to a clinic for sterilization, he fled to the United 
States.4  Chang sought asylum and argued that he feared persecution on account 
of his membership in a particular social group, namely, persons who oppose the 
one-child policy.5  He further argued that the one-child policy violated rights 
guaranteed by the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution, thus ren-
dering the policy persecutory on its face.6  The Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA) however, dismissed his appeal on the grounds that the Chinese govern-
ment enforced the policy uniformly and without discrimination.7  In rejecting 
the idea that the consequences awaiting Chang, such as fines and forced sterili-
zation, amounted to persecution, the BIA wrote: 
The respondent submits that the freedom to have children is an 
absolute right under the 14th amendment to the United States 
Constitution and, for that reason, countries that abridge this 
 
* University of Florida Fredric G. Levin College of Law.  J.D., Harvard Law School; B.A., Stanford 
University.  I benefited from feedback received at the Eleventh Circuit Scholarship Forum, the Immi-
gration Law Teachers Workshop, the Conference of Asian Pacific American Law Faculty, and the LWI 
Writers Workshop.  A number of colleagues commented generously on earlier drafts, particularly Sa-
brineh Ardalan, Stewart Chang, Deborah Gordon, Shani King, Hiroshi Motomura, Sharon Rush, and 
Stacey Steinberg.  I am also grateful to Stephanie Bornstein, Darren Hutchinson, Laura Rosenbury, 
Wendy Shea, Amy Stein, Rita Barnett, Lynn Marcus, Sugata Ray, Scott Rempell, David Thronson, 
and Virgil Wiebe for valuable conversations about this project.  Toni-Ann Miller, Samuel Alexander, 
and Julia Kapusta provided outstanding research assistance. 
1. Matter of Chang, 20 I. & N. Dec. 38  (B.I.A. 1989). 
2. Id. at 39. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. at 43. 
6. Id. at 46. 
7. Id. at 43–44. 
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right must be found to be engaging in acts of persecution.  The 
resolution of the constitutional issues that could arise if the 
population problems underlying the implementation of the 
‘one couple, one child’ policy in China were to occur in the 
United States is a matter of speculation that it is hoped this 
country need never address.  However, the fact that a citizen of 
another country may not enjoy the same constitutional protec-
tions as a citizen of the United States does not mean that he is 
therefore persecuted on account of one of the five grounds enu-
merated in section 101(a)(42)(A) of the [Immigration and Na-
tionality] Act.8 
Thus, the BIA rejected the view that a policy adopted by a foreign country 
amounts to persecution simply for its failure to pass U.S. constitutional muster, 
and an asylum applicant’s proof of a constitutional violation is insufficient to 
prove his eligibility for asylum.9 
The second story takes place years later and involves a man named Nasser 
Mustapha Karouni, a gay man with HIV, who lived in Lebanon and faced brutal 
violence by homophobic militias that the government failed to control.10  He 
applied for asylum, but the Immigration Judge denied him relief, and the BIA 
affirmed.11  He petitioned for review in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit.12  Invoking Lawrence v. Texas,13 the court explained that Karouni faced 
grave danger for exercising a fundamental liberty protected by the U.S. Consti-
tution’s Due Process Clause.14  The court reasoned: 
[T]he Attorney General is essentially arguing that the INA re-
quires Karouni to change a fundamental aspect of his human 
identity and forsake the intimate contact and enduring personal 
bond that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment protects from impingement in this country and that 
“ha[ve] been accepted as an integral part of human freedom in 
many other countries[.]”15 
Thus, the likely violation of a constitutional norm was sufficient to justify 
 
8. Id. at 46. 
9. See id.  Chang was decided prior to the 1996 Amendments to the refugee definition to include 
individuals subject to coercive family planning policies.  See INA § 101(a)(42)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(42)(B) (2012). 
10. Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163, 1165–68 (9th Cir. 2005). 
11. Id. at 1165–66. 
12. Id. 
13. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
14. Karouni, 399 F.3d at 1173. 
15. Id. (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003)) (citation omitted). 
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granting Karouni’s petition for review.  As illustrated by these vignettes, U.S. 
courts at times invoke U.S. constitutional norms explicitly when deciding asy-
lum cases based on harm that foreign citizens suffer in their home countries.16 
This practice is both surprising and sensible.  The surprise follows from 
asylum law’s status as the most “thoroughly international” area of U.S. law.17  
Asylum law is based on the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status 
of Refugees (Refugee Convention)18 and the 1967 Protocol to the Refugee Con-
vention.19  It articulates states’ obligation to shield refugees from persecution 
and the rights that accrue to refugees in the asylum state.20  Moreover, Congress 
designed the Refugee Act of 1980—the domestic statute implementing the 
treaty—to bring U.S. law into conformity with international law.21  As a result, 
scholars have long advocated for courts to interpret U.S. asylum law more con-
sistently with international law.22  In such a context, courts’ use of U.S. consti-
tutional law conflicts with the conventional scholarly wisdom.23 
The practice, however, also makes sense for a number of reasons.  First, the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) expressly contem-
plates that courts will reference national legislation as a yardstick when evalu-
ating the legitimacy of another state’s actions.  The UNHCR Handbook (the 
Handbook)—the premier guide to interpreting the Refugee Convention—itself 
advocates resorting to domestic law when analyzing issues such as the distinc-
 
16. Although this Article exclusively focuses on federal courts’ and agencies’ explicit use of 
constitutional norms in asylum adjudications, adjudicators have also invoked constitutional norms im-
plicitly.  See Dwomoh v. Sava, 696 F. Supp. 970, 972 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (finding that applicant faced 
persecution on account of his political opinion where he participated in a coup d’etat of an authoritarian 
government that deprived defendants of jury trials and rights sounding in due process); Matter of Izat-
ula, 20 I. & N. Dec. 149, 154 (B.I.A. 1990) (finding that applicant faced “persecution” rather than 
“prosecution” by authoritarian Afghan government due to that government’s illegitimacy and lack of 
democratic institutions). 
17. Bassina Farbenblum, Executive Deference in U.S. Refugee Law: Internationalist Paths 
Through and Beyond Chevron, 60 DUKE L. J. 1059, 1061 (2011). 
18. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, pmbl., July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 
U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter Refugee Convention]. 
19. DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES § 1:3 (2015 ed.) (“[T]he 
United States enacted specific statutory measures to conform provisions of its domestic law to the 
Refugee Convention.”). 
20. Refugee Convention, supra note 18, arts. 1, 33. 
21. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 (1987); Farbenblum, supra note 17, at 1061–62. 
22. See, e.g., ANKER, supra note 19, § 1:5; Joan Fitzpatrick, The International Dimension of U.S. 
Refugee Law, 15 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 1, 24–25 (1997); Karen Musalo, Irreconcilable Differences?  
Divorcing Refugee Protections From Human Rights Norms, 15 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1179, 1240 (1994). 
23. See Musalo, supra note 22, at 1240. 
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tion between a state’s lawful prosecution of a criminal defendant and the ille-
gitimate persecution of one of its citizens.24  The Handbook recommends that 
states consider their own national legislation, as well as principles contained in 
“various international instruments relating to human rights . . . .”25  Thus, reli-
ance on domestic law when evaluating eligibility for asylum is not completely 
novel. 
Second, the practice of using constitutional norms makes sense because 
asylum law and constitutional law, although distinct in purpose, both protect 
civil and political rights.26  Asylum law creates a status (asylum) that protects 
individuals from persecution on account of a protected characteristic, and per-
secution often takes the form of a violation of a core human right, such as the 
right to hold a religious belief or to express a political opinion.27  Constitutional 
law, through the Bill of Rights, protects some of these same rights, such as the 
free exercise of religion and the right to free speech.28  Both areas of law often 
call upon courts to analyze the legitimacy of challenged state action and define 
the contours of a civil or political right.29  Both areas of law also identify pro-
tected groups in society: asylum law articulates protected characteristics in the 
definition of “refugee,” and constitutional law identifies suspect classifications 
throu gh its Equal Protection Clause jurisprudence.30  Thus, the common lan-
guage of rights and legitimacy produces a “family resemblance”31 between the 
fields that makes the use of constitutional norms sensible and intuitive in the 
 
24.  UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND 
CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE 1967 
PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES ¶¶ 59-60 (1992), http://www.un-
hcr.org/4d93528a9.pdf [https://perma.cc/P79Y-Y7XN] [hereinafter UNHCR HANDBOOK]; KAREN 
MUSALO, JENNIFER MOORE & RICHARD A. BOSWELL, REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY: A COMPARATIVE 
AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACH 919 (2d ed. 2002). 
25. See UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 24, ¶ 60. 
26. Others have identified comparable links between international human rights law and U.S. 
constitutional law.  See, e.g., Louis Henkin, Rights: American and Human, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 405, 
415 (1979) (observing similarities between American constitutional rights and international human 
rights).  Unlike human rights law, the U.S. constitution fails to mention or protect any economic, social, 
or cultural rights, many of which are relevant to asylum.  See id. at 418. 
27. ANKER, supra note 19, § 1:2. 
28. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 11.1 (4th ed. 
2011) (discussing the reasons why the Constitution protects free expression, one of which is to promote 
self-governance); id. § 12.3.1 (discussing the Constitution’s “absolute” protection for freedom of reli-
gious belief). 
29. Id. § 12.3.1; ANKER, supra note 19, §§ 1:1–1:5. 
30. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 28, § 9.1.1. 
31. Cf. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS ¶ 66–67 (G. E. M. 
Anscombe, R. Rhees & G. H. Von Wright eds., 3d ed. 1958) (describing how different meanings of a 
word share a family resemblance, “overlapping and criss-crossing.”). 
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asylum context.32 
Finally, scholars have noted the important background role that constitu-
tional norms have played in the U.S. legal system.33  These norms, such as the 
prohibition on racial discrimination, permeate the legal culture that judges in-
habitand inform judicial interpretation of statutes.34  Unsurprisingly, this influ-
ence extends to immigration law,35 and as this Article determines, to asylum 
law in particular. 
This Article examines asylum decisions in which courts invoke U.S. con-
stitutional norms when analyzing whether the harm and failure of state protec-
tion an asylum applicant has suffered constitute “persecution,” and if so, 
whether this persecution has been inflicted “on account of”36 a protected char-
acteristic.37  Scholars have addressed the role of constitutional principles as im-
portant background norms for interpreting statutes and regulations in the immi-
gration context,38 and some have assumed or noted in passing a relationship 
between constitutional law and asylum law.39  However, to this author’s 
 
32. Cf. Jack Goldsmith & Daryl Levinson, Law for States: International Law, Constitutional 
Law, Public Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1791, 1794 (2009) (arguing that constitutional law shares many 
of the same attributes that lead scholars to doubt the viability of international law). 
33. Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitu-
tional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L. J. 545, 549, 562 (1990) (discussing Bob Jones 
University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983)). 
34. Id. at 549. 
35. Id. 
36. The requirement that persecution be inflicted “on account of” a protected characteristic is 
known as the “nexus” requirement and follows from the definition of “refugee” contained in Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act.  Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 
1101(a)(42)(A) (2012); see ANKER, supra note 19, § 5:1. 
37. See, e.g., Kazemzadeh v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 577 F.3d 1341, 1345 (11th Cir. 2009); Al-Ghorbani 
v. Holder, 585 F.3d 980, 999 (6th Cir. 2009); Pavlyk v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 1082, 1087 (7th Cir. 2006); 
Musabelliu v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 991, 994 (7th Cir. 2006); Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163 (9th 
Cir. 2005); Canas-Segovia v. INS, 902 F.2d 717 (9th Cir. 1990); Di v. Carroll, 842 F. Supp. 858 (E.D. 
Va. 1994). 
38. Motomura, supra note 33, at 549 (“‘[C]onstitutional’ norms provide the background context 
that informs our interpretations of statutes and other subconstitutional texts.”). 
39. Id. at 564.  For other scholarly mentions of the link between asylum law and constitutional 
law, see, e.g., Scott Rempell, Defining Persecution, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 283, 312 (2013) (discussing 
the role of constitutional law as a “benchmark” for conduct not condoned by the United States, but 
noting that “[c]onstitutional violations . . . cannot form the definitive basis for finding that an appli-
cant’s experiences establish persecution.”); id. at 328 (noting similarity of analysis of whether harm is 
“illegitimate” to whether the State has engaged in impermissible action or inaction under U.S. consti-
tutional law); Susan Hazeldean, Confounding Identities: The Paradox of LGBT Children Under Asy-
lum Law, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 373, 375–77 (2011) (describing asylum law’s failure to keep pace 
with developments in constitutional law with respect to LGBT persons, but not supplying a rationale 
for linking the two areas); Hollis V. Pfitsch, Homosexuality in Asylum and Constitutional Law: Rhet-
oric of Acts and Identity, 15 L. & SEXUALITY 59, 82 (2006) (describing implications of Romer v. Evans 
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knowledge, no article to-date has systematically addressed the role of constitu-
tional norms in asylum adjudications. 
This Article analyzes this unusual practice and finds that federal courts use 
constitutional norms in diverse and sometimes inconsistent ways.  The two 
cases described above, Chang and Karouni, illustrate one of the principal in-
consistencies in federal court practice, but this Article identifies and explains 
another.  First, as illustrated by Karouni, some courts have used constitutional 
law to articulate a minimum floor of protection that foreign countries are ex-
pected to provide.40  If a foreign country fails to provide this minimum level of 
protection, as drawn from the U.S. Constitution, that foreign state risks that its 
treatment of its citizen could amount to persecution on account of a protected 
characteristic under U.S. asylum law.  In turn, this persecution on account of a 
protected characteristic would render this foreign citizen eligible for asylum in 
the United States.  These are cases in which proving a constitutional violation 
is sufficient to demonstrate eligibility for asylum.  In direct contrast, some 
courts41 have acknowledged that the treatment at issue could violate the U.S. 
Constitution, but the treatment nonetheless does not qualify as persecution on 
account of a protected characteristic.42  In these cases, proving a constitutional 
violation is insufficient to demonstrate eligibility for asylum.  This Article refers 
to this contradiction as “sufficient” versus “insufficient.” 
The second contradiction begins with courts that use constitutional law to 
articulate a minimum level of harm required for the harm to constitute persecu-
tion, where any harm not reaching that threshold is necessarily not persecution 
on account of a protected characteristic.  In these cases, a foreign state that in-
flicts or is complicit in the infliction of harm not rising to the level of a consti-
tutional violation can be assured that U.S. federal courts will not regard its treat-
ment of its citizen as persecution on account of a protected characteristic under 
 
and Lawrence v. Texas on asylum claims brought by gays and lesbians); Craig B. Mousin, Standing 
with the Persecuted: Adjudicating Religious Asylum Claims After the Enactment of the International 
Religious Freedom Act of 1998, 2003 BYU L. REV. 541, 549–551 (2003) (arguing that First Amend-
ment jurisprudence is relevant to religious asylum claims because the drafters of the Refugee Conven-
tion intended states to use their domestic constitutional protections as a “floor” and accord foreign 
nationals at least as favorable treatment as accorded states’ own citizens). 
40. The notion that every country must provide a minimum level of protection to its citizen un-
derlies refugee law, for when the home country is unable or unwilling to protect its citizens, refugee 
law offers “surrogate protection.”  See ANKER, supra note 19, § 4:3 (“As noted, the Refugee Conven-
tion provides ‘surrogate or substitute protection’ . . . [of] basic human rights . . . .” (quoting JAMES C. 
HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (2005)). 
41. The analysis in this Article is generally limited to federal appellate decisions because very 
few agency decisions discuss U.S. constitutional norms in asylum cases. 
42. Romeike v. Holder, 718 F.3d 528, 534 (6th Cir. 2013). 
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U.S. asylum law.  These are cases in which a constitutional violation is a nec-
essary condition of demonstrating eligibility for asylum.  Again, in direct con-
trast, other courts suggest that harms not amounting to a constitutional violation 
under U.S. law may still amount to persecution on account of a protected char-
acteristic.  In these cases, proving a constitutional violation is unnecessary to 
demonstrating eligibility for asylum.  This Article refers to this contradiction as 
“necessary” versus “unnecessary.”  Ultimately, this Article analyzes and ex-
plains these inconsistencies and the varied roles of constitutional law in asylum 
cases. 
II. FOUNDATIONS OF U.S. ASYLUM LAW 
U.S. asylum law is based on the United Nations Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees, the Protocol to this treaty, and a domestic statute, the Ref-
ugee Act of 1980.  International human rights principles inform both the Con-
vention and Protocol, and these international authorities inform the domestic 
statute. 
A. Refugee Convention & Protocol 
International refugee law is based on the 1951 United Nations Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention).43  The Refugee Con-
vention defines “refugee” as a person who “owing to well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is 
unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of 
that country . . . .”44  Article 33 obligates states party not to refouler (return) 
migrants whose life or freedom “would be threatened” on account of a protected 
characteristic.45 
The 1967 Protocol to the Refugee Convention revised the definition of ref-
ugee to eliminate the geographic and temporal limitations present in the 1951 
Convention.46  As the Protocol incorporated the key provisions of the 1951 
 
43. Refugee Convention, supra note 18, art. 1. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. art. 33.1. 
46. Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 2, http://www.unhcr.org/pro-
tect/PROTECTION/3b66c2aa10.pdf [https://perma.cc/6KEA-LRQC] (“The Convention  . . . has been 
subject to only one amendment in the form of a 1967 Protocol, which removed the geographic and 
temporal limits of the 1951 Convention.”). 
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Convention, in ratifying the 1967 Protocol, the United States adopted those pro-
visions of the 1951 Convention as well.47  At the time, the Executive Branch 
assured Congress that the treaty created no new obligations and merely repre-
sented a codification of the nation’s existing refugee protection policies.48 
B. Refugee Act of 1980 
Congress codified the key provisions of the Refugee Convention and Pro-
tocol into domestic law through the Refugee Act of 1980.49  Through the Act, 
Congress adopted the definition of “refugee” articulated in the Refugee Con-
vention50 and the nonrefoulement obligation of Art. 33, which is known in U.S. 
law as “withholding of removal.”51  Legislative history demonstrates that Con-
gress intended to bring U.S. law into accord with international refugee law.52  
While asylum is a discretionary form of relief, withholding is mandatory.53 
1. Asylum 
Asylum is available to individuals who demonstrate that they are “refu-
gee[s.]”54  The Immigration and Nationality Act defines “refugee” as: 
(A) any person who is outside any country of such person’s 
nationality . . . and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and 
is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protec-
tion of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded 
fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, 
membership in a particular social group, or political opin-
ion . . . .55 
Any person who satisfies this definition is eligible for asylum, provided that 
 
47.  See David A. Martin, Reforming Asylum Adjudication: on Navigating the Coast of Bohemia, 
138 U. PA. L. REV. 1247, 1258 (1990) (“Because the 1967 Protocol incorporates by reference all of 
the important operative provisions of the 1951 Convention, with one important modification in the 
definition of “refugee,” ratification was tantamount to acceding to the earlier instrument.”). 
48.  See id. at 1259. 
49. See Deborah E. Anker & Michael H. Posner, The Forty Years Crisis: A Legislative History 
of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9, 11 (1980) (characterizing the Act as “the most 
comprehensive United States law ever enacted concerning refugee admissions and resettlement.”). 
50. Id. (noting the Act’s adoption of “the international definition of refugee from the [Refugee 
Convention].”). 
51. See INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 208.16 (2016). 
52. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 (1987). 
53. Anker & Posner, supra note 49, at 63. 
54. See INA § 208(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2012) (asylum may be granted to an alien 
who either the Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General determine to fall within the 
definition of “refugee” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012)).  
55. INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012). 
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no bars to asylum or grounds for exclusion from protection apply to him or 
her.56  In addition, Congress amended the definition in 1996 to include individ-
uals subject to coercive population control policies.57  However, not everyone 
who is eligible for asylum is entitled to receive it.  Instead, the Attorney General 
or Secretary of Homeland Secuirty makes the ultimate determination whether 
to grant relief in his or her discretion.58 
2. Withholding of removal 
In contrast to discretionary asylum, withholding of removal is a mandatory 
form of relief from removal.59  Based on the Refugee Convention’s nonre-
foulement provision contained in Article 33, withholding is available where an 
applicant demonstrates that his or her “life or freedom would be threatened” on 
account of one of the five protected characteristics.60  The United States Su-
preme Court has determined that an applicant must prove a level of risk amount-
ing to a “clear probability” rather than merely the “well-founded fear” required 
for asylum.61  Withholding is an important form of relief, especially for indi-
viduals who fail to file their asylum applications within one-year of arriving in 
the United States62 or who are deemed “firmly resettled” in a third country prior 
to arrival.63 
Claims for asylum and withholding begin with an asylum officer or Immi-
gration Judge and move through the system, ultimately landing in the U.S. 
Court of Appeals.64 
 
56. INA § 208(b)(1)(A),  8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2012). 
57. The amendment is reflected in INA § 101(a)(42)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B) (2012): 
For purposes of determinations under this chapter, a person who has been forced 
to abort a pregnancy or to undergo involuntary sterilization, or who has been per-
secuted for failure or refusal to undergo such a procedure or for other resistance 
to a coercive population control program, shall be deemed to have been perse-
cuted on account of political opinion, and a person who has a well founded fear 
that he or she will be forced to undergo such a procedure or subject to persecution 
for such failure, refusal, or resistance shall be deemed to have a well founded fear 
of persecution on account of political opinion. 
58. INA § 208(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(A) (2012); 
59. INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2012). 
60. INA § 241(b)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) (2012). 
61. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 430 (1984). 
62. See INA § 208(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (2012). 
63. See INA § 208(b)(2)(A)(vi), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi) (2012). 
64. Federal appeals courts consider petitions for review from unsuccessful asylum applicants at 
the end of a long road.  The Immigration and Nationality Act, Section 208, establishes the procedure 
for applying for asylum and withholding. See INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2012).  Asylum seekers 
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III. THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS IN INTERPRETING “REFUGEE” 
Federal appellate courts use U.S. constitutional law to interpret the concept 
of “persecution” and the requirement that persecution occur “on account of” a 
protected characteristic, otherwise known as the nexus requirement.65  To the 
extent that courts use constitutional norms in asylum adjudications at all, they 
tend to use them as a “benchmark”66 for evaluating laws and practices in other 
countries to determine both whether the harm and failure of state protection is 
sufficiently severe to qualify as persecution and whether it has the requisite 
 
may apply for asylum either affirmatively or defensively.  Id.  Affirmative applicants lodge an appli-
cation once they are physically present in the United States, regardless of their immigration status.  See 
Obtaining Asylum in the United States, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. (October 19, 2015), 
http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/obtaining-asylum-united-states 
[https://perma.cc/K27K-TY6P].  Defensive applicants, in contrast, are already in removal proceedings 
at the time they lodge their application; this means that the government has already apprehended the 
applicant and issued a Notice to Appear.  See id.An affirmative asylum applicant begins the application 
process by submitting a written application along with the form I-589.  See 8 C.F.R. § 208.3 (2016).  
Affirmative applicants appear before an asylum officer who then conducts a non-adversarial interview.  
8 C.F.R. §§ 208.9, 208.2(a) (2016) (describing initial jurisdiction of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services Refugee, Asylum and International Operations).  For affirmative applications, the Refugee, 
Asylum and International Operations (RAIO) officer considers all of the documents submitted as well 
as the applicant’s narrative and must communicate his or her decision in writing.  See 8 C.F.R. § 208.19 
(2016). If the officer grants asylum, then the process ends, and the Service may not appeal.  If the 
officer decides not to grant asylum, or to refer the case to an immigration judge (IJ), then the IJ conducts 
a de novo hearing on the applicant’s claim.  See 8 C.F.R. 208.14(c) (2016) (describing denial, referral, 
or dismissal by an asylum officer); Obtaining Asylum in the United States, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & 
IMMIGRATION SERVS. (October 19, 2015), http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asy-
lum/obtaining-asylum-united-states [https://perma.cc/6CB2-KDVT].  Defensive applicants do not ap-
pear before an asylum officer; instead, they present their claim to the IJ as a defense to removal in the 
course of their removal proceedings.  8 C.F.R. § 208.2(b) (2016) (describing “exclusive jurisdiction” 
enjoyed by Immigration Judges in defensive cases, where the applicant is in removal proceedings).  
For both affirmative applicants who have been denied or referred to the IJ and for defensive applicants, 
the IJ conducts an adversarial hearing; the government actively opposes the applicant’s claim for asy-
lum.  Obtaining Asylum in the United States, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS. (October 19, 
2015), http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/obtaining-asylum-united-states 
[https://perma.cc/FFB7-QYRQ].  Either party may then appeal the IJ’s decision.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b) 
(defining BIA’s appellate jurisdiction), 1003.3(a) (describing procedure for either party to file a notice 
of appeal) (2012). If the BIA affirms the grant of asylum or remands back to the IJ to grant, the process 
ends successfully for the applicant; the government may not seek review.  INA § 242(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a)(1) (2012) (permitting judicial review of orders of removal).  If the BIA reverses a grant of 
asylum or affirms a denial, the applicant’s exclusive means of review is through filing a petition for 
review to the appropriate U.S. Court of Appeals.  INA § 242(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) (2012) (stat-
ing that a petition for review “filed with an appropriate court of appeals . . . shall be the sole and 
exclusive means for judicial review of an order of removal . . . .”).  As a result, a large portion of the 
federal appellate docket consists of such petitions for review. 
65. ANKER, supra note 19, §§ 5:1, 5:11–12. 
66. Rempell, supra note 39, at 311–12. 
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nexus to a protected characteristic, such as religion or political opinion.67 
Defining persecution on account of a protected characteristic is a complex 
task, one aided by the use of multiple sources.  Neither the Refugee Convention 
nor the Act defines “persecution,” and scholars have noted the dearth of efforts 
to define the concept.68  Other scholars have recognized that “persecution” is a 
purposefully “flexible” concept, one designed to respond to evolving modes of 
harm.69  As a result of its open-endedness, many have drawn on international 
human rights law to understand persecution.70  Scholars have justified this re-
sort to international human rights law by referencing the Preamble of the Ref-
ugee Convention.71  The Preamble cites the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights as the essential context of the treaty, which informs the treaty’s object 
and purpose.72  Noted asylum scholar James C. Hathaway has described perse-
cution as the “systematic violation of basic human rights demonstrative of a 
failure of state protection.”73  On this view, only the violation of “core” human 
rights—not merely any right protected by an international human rights instru-
ment—can constitute persecution.74  Accordingly, persecution is “the sustained 
or systemic violation of basic human rights demonstrative of a failure of state 
 
67. See, e.g., Kazemzadeh v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 577 F.3d 1341, 1358–59 (11th Cir. 2009) (Marcus, 
J., concurring) (invoking Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence in analyzing whether applicant would 
suffer religious persecution if forced to pray in secret); Canas-Segovia v. INS, 902 F.2d 717, 723 n.11 
(9th Cir. 1990) (characterizing Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence as “relevant” to the analysis of 
whether harm awaiting applicants amounted to religious persecution), vacated and remanded, 502 U.S. 
1086 (1992), remanded, 970 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1992); Di v. Carroll, 842 F. Supp. 858, 872–73 (E.D. 
Va. 1994) (analyzing U.S. constitutional law to determine whether opposition to coercive population 
control policies constituted a “political opinion” for asylum purposes), overruled by Di v. Moscato, 66 
F.3d 315, 1995 WL 543525 (4th Cir. 1995). 
68. Rempell, supra note 39, at 284 (discussing manner in which Board of Immigration Appeals 
has “sidestepped” the task of defining persecution, the federal courts have “shied away from formulat-
ing any unified definition,” and refugee scholars have not undertaken “major efforts to define persecu-
tion . . . .”). 
69. ANKER, supra note 19, § 4.4. 
70. Id. § 4:2.  Scholars justify this reliance on the Refugee Convention’s reference to international 
human rights law in the Preamble.  Id. 
71. Refugee Convention, supra note 18, pmbl. 
72. Id.; see Deborah E. Anker, Refugee Law, Gender, and the Human Rights Paradigm, 15 
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 133, 133 (2002). 
73. See Matthew E. Price, Persecution Complex: Justifying Asylum Law’s Preference for Perse-
cuted People, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 413, 454 (2006) (describing James Hathaway’s “surrogate protec-
tion” view). 
74. ANKER, supra note 19, § 4:3.  Nonetheless, the definition of a “core” human right continues 
to evolve.  See James C. Hathaway & Jason Pobjoy, Queer Cases Make Bad Law, 44 N.Y.U. J. INT’L 
L. & POL. 315, 347 (2011).  I thank Sabrineh Ardalan for raising this point. 
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protection.”75 
U.S. courts have understood persecution to mean severe harm in the ab-
sence of state protection.76  Courts have interpreted the concept to include “non-
legitimate harm or harm deemed offensive under some normative rubric.”77  Yet 
persecution does not encompass every form of “suffering or harm [inflicted] 
upon those who differ (in race, religion, or political opinion) in a way regarded 
as offensive.”78  It is, instead, an “extreme concept.”79 
Rights violations can constitute persecution in a variety of ways.  A law of 
general applicability can constitute persecution when it is inherently persecu-
tory or when its enforcement or the punishment for violation is persecutory.80  
For example, although compulsory military service is generally not considered 
persecution, a compulsory military service law may be inherently persecutory 
where the military in question routinely commits international human rights 
abuses. 81  In such a case, regardless of whether the law is enforced “neutrally” 
or the punishment for desertion is reasonable, the law is inherently persecu-
tory.82  Absent this inherently persecutory character, however, a law of general 
applicability can lead to persecution where the government discriminatorily en-
forces the law or punishes violations disproportionately.83  For example, if a 
government enforces a compulsory military service law only with respect to 
certain racial or religious minorities, such enforcement of a “neutral” law may 
constitute persecution.  And if violations of the law are punished disproportion-
ately, that, too, may evince a persecutory intent.84 
Interpreting “persecution” relating to a law of general applicability is par-
ticularly fraught because U.S. courts are called upon to judge the legitimacy of 
another country’s laws and practices.85  A judgment of legitimacy is laden with 
 
75. DAVID A. MARTIN, ET AL., FORCED MIGRATION: LAW AND POLICY 151 (2d ed. 2013) (quot-
ing JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 104–05 (1991)); see ANKER, supra note 
19, § 4:3. 
76. ANKER, supra note 19, § 4:4. 
77. Id. 
78. MARTIN, supra note 75, at 131 (quoting Ghaly v. INS, 58 F.3d 1425, 1431 (9th Cir. 1995)). 
79. Id.; see also ANKER, supra note 19, § 4:4. 
80. ANKER, supra note 19, § 4:6 (“Laws that punish the exercise of a fundamental, internationally 
protected human right, such as the right to protest peacefully or the right to the free exercise of religion, 
may be considered persecutory per se.”). 
81. Id. §§ 4:6, 5:28. 
82. See id. § 4:6. 
83. See MARTIN, supra note 75, at 131–32; ANKER, supra note 19, § 4.6. 
84. ANKER, supra note 19, §§ 4.6, 5.28. 
85. MARTIN, supra note 75, at 132. 
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values, including constitutional ones.86  Constitutional norms, however, have 
an uncertain role in this context.  On the one hand, they may provide helpful 
benchmarks for gauging whether the challenged law, its application, or the pre-
scribed punishment is within the discretion a country has to adopt and enforce 
its criminal laws, or whether they transgress more widely-shared standards.  On 
the other hand, constitutional norms are hardly universal, and courts and agen-
cies have expressed concern about imposing U.S. constitutional values on the 
world.87 
Constitutional norms also play a role in interpreting “nexus.”  The nexus 
element requires that the persecution be “on account of” one of the protected 
characteristics listed in the definition of refugee,88 and this element often re-
quires courts to interpret the meaning of categories such as “political opinion” 
or “religion.”  The U.S. Supreme Court initially articulated the nexus require-
ment in terms of the persecutor’s “motives.”89  However, this standard deviated 
from international guidance on the matter, eliciting criticism from commenta-
tors.90  Proposing an alternative to a motives-based inquiry, the UNHCR has 
explained “that the persecution or fear of persecution [must] be ‘related to the 
grounds’ so that the grounds ‘result’ in the persecution.”91  “Grounds” and “rea-
sons” direct the adjudicator to focus on facts about the applicant rather than the 
intent of the persecutors.92  Perhaps in response to growing recognition of the 
gap between domestic and international standards,93 Congress amended the Im-
migration and Nationality Act (INA) in 2005 to require asylum applicants to 
prove that the protected characteristic of the applicant, such as her political 
opinion or religion, was or would be “at least one central reason” for the perse-
cution.94  Scholars have suggested that the shift from “motives” to “reasons” 
 
86. See id. 
87. See, e.g., Matter of Izatula, 20 I. & N. Dec. 149, 156 (B.I.A. 1990) (Vacca, J., concurring); 
Matter of Chang, 20 I. & N. Dec. 38, 46 (B.I.A. 1989). 
88. ANKER, supra note 19, § 5.1. 
89. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992); see ANKER, supra note 19, § 5.5 (discussing 
INS v. Elias-Zacarias). 
90. James C. Hathaway, Foreword: The Causal Nexus in International Refugee Law, 23 MICH. 
J. INT’L L. 207, 208 (2002) (characterizing the Elias-Zacarias decision as “extraordinary” and “impos-
sible to square with either the text or surrogate protection purposes of international refugee law.”); see 
also ANKER, supra note 19, § 5.5 (“The Supreme Court’s Elias-Zacarias decision was widely criti-
cized . . . .”). 
91. ANKER, supra note 19, §5:2. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. INA § 208(b)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B) (2012); ANKER, supra note 19, § 5:12. 
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signifies a shift toward the international standard for nexus.95 
Federal courts have used constitutional law to analyze whether a reason for 
the harm suffered or feared is a protected characteristic.  Specifically, courts 
have used constitutional law to evaluate whether the applicant’s opinion is a 
political one,96 for example, by analyzing whether the opinion constitutes pro-
tected political speech under the First Amendment.97  Courts have also used 
constitutional law to define a particular social group based on views of mar-
riage, noting the status of marriage as a fundamental right under U.S. constitu-
tional law.98 
Only a very limited set of asylum cases relies explicitly on constitutional 
norms, for U.S. constitutional law has no necessary role in asylum adjudica-
tions.99  Unsurprisingly, most asylum cases do not discuss or cite U.S. consti-
tutional decisions, and in the vast majority of cases, proving that the harm an 
asylum seeker suffered would have violated the U.S. constitution had the harm 
occurred on U.S. soil or at the hands of U.S. government officials has no role 
in proving a claim for refugee status.  Among the cases that do rely on U.S. 
constitutional norms, however, courts use constitutional norms diversely, and 
at some level, inconsistently. 
A. The first distinction: sufficient versus insufficient 
In asylum cases involving gay rights,100 the free exercise of religion,101 and 
the right to procreate,102 courts have typically used constitutional norms to ar-
ticulate a minimum floor of protection, so that an asylum seeker is entitled to 
protection as long as he or she proves that the harm suffered on account of a 
protected characteristic would have violated the U.S. constitution.  In other 
words, these cases suggest a violation of constitutional norms is sufficient to 
result in an asylum grant.103 
 
95. ANKER, supra note 19, § 5:2. 
96. Pavlyk v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 1082, 1092 (7th Cir. 2006); Musabelliu v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 
991, 996 (7th Cir. 2006). 
97. Pavlyk, 469 F.3d at 1092; Musabelliu, 442 F.3d at 996. 
98. Al-Ghorbani v. Holder, 585 F.3d 980, 996 (6th Cir. 2009). 
99. Cf. Rempell, supra note 39, at 312 (noting that, “[c]onstitutional violations . . . cannot form 
the definitive basis for a finding that an applicant’s experiences establish persecution,” but acknowl-
edging that “a constitutional infirmity may bear relevance to the severity inquiry . . . .”). 
100. Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2005). 
101. Kazemzadeh v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 577 F.3d 1341, 1356 (11th Cir. 2009) (Marcus, J., concur-
ring); Canas-Segovia v. INS, 902 F.2d 717, 723 (9th Cir. 1990). 
102. Di v. Carroll, 842 F. Supp. 858, 872 (E.D. Va. 1994). 
103. In these cases, judges generally acknowledge three points: (1) the U.S. Constitution does 
not apply to foreign jurisdictions; (2) proving a constitutional violation doesn’t always entitle a refugee 
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In direct contrast, other cases explicitly hold that proof of a constitutional 
violation is simply not enough to demonstrate eligibility for asylum.104  These 
cases, as described below, typically involve claims based on the violation of 
civil rights where the state has imposed less severe forms of harm, such as fines 
or other non-physical punishment, on those who violate facially neutral laws,105 
or where the violation of a constitutional norm is at best uncertain.106 
1. Sufficient 
In this first set of cases, courts regard proof of a constitutional violation 
under U.S. law as enough to render an applicant eligible for asylum.  In Canas-
Segovia v. INS, the Ninth Circuit determined that El Salvador’s facially neutral 
conscription law persecuted the petitioners on account of their religious beliefs 
and imputed political opinion of opposition to the government.107  The law in 
question contained no exemption for religious reasons and punished refusal to 
serve in the Salvadoran military by imprisonment.108  The court observed that 
petitioners, Jehovah’s witnesses, had “genuine religious convictions which pre-
vent[ed] them from performing military service.”109  Accordingly, they would 
be imprisoned for their refusal to serve in the military, and this imprisonment 
would be “on account of [their] religious beliefs.”110  Moreover, the court de-
termined that the government would impute to petitioners oppositional political 
views, which could lead to “extra-judicial sanctions including torture and 
death.”111 
In reaching this conclusion, the court analyzed the UNHCR Handbook as 
well as U.S. constitutional law on the free exercise of religion.  Acknowledging 
that U.S. constitutional law does not bind foreign countries such as El Salvador, 
the court noted without further elaboration that, “United States jurisprudence is 
 
to asylum; and (3) constitutional law is nonetheless relevant to the interpretation of “refugee.”  Upon 
deeming constitutional principles relevant to asylum law, even with these caveats, courts typically find 
in favor of the refugee.  Kazemzadeh, 577 F.3d at 1358 (Marcus, J., concurring); Karouni, 399 F.3d at 
1173; Canas-Segovia, 902 F.2d at 723; Di, 842 F. Supp. at 873. 
104. See infra Part III.A.2. 
105. See e.g., Romeike v. Holder, 718 F.3d 528, 530 (6th Cir. 2013) (“There is a difference be-
tween the persecution of a discrete group and the prosecution of those who violate a generally appli-
cable law.”). 
106. See, e.g., Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 230–31 (3d Cir. 2004). 
107. Canas-Segovia v. INS, 902 F.2d at 727–28, vacated and remanded, 502 U.S. 1086 (1992), 
remanded, 970 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1992). 
108. Id.  at 727. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 728. 
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[nonetheless] relevant to analysis of new issues of United States refugee 
law.”112  The court noted that such precedents established that “a regulation 
neutral upon its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitu-
tional requirement for government neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exer-
cise of religion.”113  Thus, relying on what was then an “elementary tenet of 
United States constitutional law,” the court concluded that the Salvadoran con-
scription policy could constitute persecution despite its facial neutrality.114  In 
this way, the Ninth Circuit appeared to regard a constitutional violation under 
U.S. law as not only relevant, but sufficient in itself to demonstrate persecution 
on account of religion and imputed political opinion.115 
Even though Canas-Segovia is no longer precedential, the Ninth Circuit’s 
willingness to consider constitutional comparisons is striking and important.  
The court cautiously invoked constitutional norms, acknowledging that they 
were not binding, but nonetheless found Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence 
central to evaluating the relevant law in El Salvador.116  Indeed, the bulk of the 
court’s reasoning consisted of constitutional analysis, suggesting that little else 
was required to convince the court that the El Salvadoran law was persecutory 
on account of the petitioners’ religion.117 
Years later, a concurring judge on the Eleventh Circuit similarly invoked 
 
112. Id. at 723 n.11. 
113. Id. at 723 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972)). 
114. Id. at 723. 
115. Canas-Segovia is no longer precedential on account of two related developments.  In 1992, 
the Supreme Court decided INS v. Elias-Zacarias, which imposed on applicants the obligation to prove 
the persecutor’s intent or motive behind the persecution.  See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483 
(1992); Musalo, supra note 22, at 1191–92 (discussing implications of the Elias-Zacarias decision).  
The imposition of an intent requirement in Elias-Zacarias mirrored developments in First Amendment 
jurisprudence.  See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879, 885–86 (1990) (holding that 
the application of a “valid and neutral law of general applicability” need only satisfy the test of ration-
ality, not strict scrutiny (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982))); see Musalo, 
supra note 22, at 1222, 1225 (quoting Smith and discussing similarities between Elias-Zacarias and 
Smith); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 28, §12.3 (discussing Smith).  Under Smith, a plaintiff must 
prove discriminatory intent to establish a violation of the First Amendment’s guarantee of the free 
exercise of religion. Smith, 494 U.S. at 889–90. Congress responded to Smith by passing the Religion 
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), which the Supreme Court has determined overruled Smith with 
respect to the federal government only. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (held unconstitional as applied to 
state and local governments in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)).  Congress failed to 
respond similarly to Elias-Zacarias.  See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 28, § 12.3.2.4 (discussing RFRA 
and City of Boerne, 521 U.S. 507); see also Musalo, supra note 22, at 1181. 
116. Canas-Segovia, 902 F.2d at 723–24. 
117. See id. 
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the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence in explaining a fa-
vorable result for the petitioner.118  In Kazemzedah v. U.S. Attorney General,119  
the Eleventh Circuit granted in part a petition for review in a case involving an 
Iranian man who had converted to Christianity after arriving in the United 
States, and who feared returning to Iran.120  Specifically, he feared persecution 
on account of his violation of Iran’s law against apostasy.121  The majority noted 
that the IJ and BIA had inadequately considered whether the petitioner would 
suffer persecution by practicing his religion underground instead of facing pros-
ecution under the law against apostasy.122  The concurring opinion examined 
the relationship between U.S. constitutional law and refugee law.123  It noted 
that the need for petitioner to “practice his faith in the dead of night [to avoid 
persecution] collides with our nation’s ideals about the exercise of religious 
freedom.”124  Admitting that U.S. Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence does not 
govern asylum claims, the concurring opinion nonetheless asserted that “the 
suggestion implicit in the BIA’s findings and in the government’s argument 
contradicts both the values of our founders and the values that the drafters of 
the Refugee Act of 1980 embodied when codifying the asylum sections of the 
INA.”125 
With this reference to the shared values of “our founders” and the drafters 
of the Refugee Act, and the assumption that those values are common to both, 
the concurring opinion examined U.S. Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence in 
some detail,126 and rejected the notion that “secret practice [of religion] can cure 
persecution.”127  As the applicant would have to worship in secret in order to 
avoid persecution, the concurring judge found the Iranian law against apostasy 
to be inherently persecutory, largely because such a law would be unconstitu-
tional if adopted here.128  In this way, the concurring judge appeared to regard 
 
118. Kazemzadeh v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 577 F.3d 1341, 1358 (Marcus, J., concurring). 
119. Id. at 1341. 
120. Id. at 1345. 
121. Id. “Apostasy” is defined as the “renunciation of a religious belief.”  See “apostasy.” Mer-
riam-Webster Online Dictionary, 2016, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/apostasy 
[https://perma.cc/UGG2-DB4T] (Oct. 8, 2016). 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 1358 (Marcus, J., concurring). 
124. Id. 
125. Id. (citation omitted). 
126. Id. at 1359 (citing Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 214 (1963); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 
345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947); United States v. Ballard, 
322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944)). 
127. Id. at 1360. 
128. Id. at 1356. 
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a constitutional violation as a sufficient condition for triggering refugee protec-
tion. 
This approach to using constitutional norms also appears in a case involving 
the right to same-sex intimate relationships.129  Scholars have previously as-
sumed a connection between U.S. constitutional law and asylum adjudications 
in the realm of gay rights,130 but they have not challenged, explained, or ana-
lyzed it.  Assuming a connection, it is no surprise that courts adjudicating asy-
lum claims have relied on precedent such as Lawrence v. Texas,131 which held 
that laws criminalizing same-sex intimate conduct violate liberties protected by 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.132  In Karouni v. Gon-
zales,133 as noted above in the Introduction, the Ninth Circuit relied on Law-
rence in deciding that a Lebanese man had a well-founded fear of persecution 
based on his homosexuality, having AIDS, and his Shi’ite religion.134  Karouni 
testified that the Lebanese government condemned homosexuality, and that 
Hizballah, an “Islamic paramilitary organization,” regarded homosexuality as 
a crime punishable by death.135  Karouni testified that Hizballah punished ho-
mosexuality violently.136  For example, Hizballah shot Karouni’s gay cousin in 
the anus; the man survived, but Hizballah shot him again, this time, fatally.137  
Militia members confronted Karouni and pressed him to confess to the crime 
of homosexuality for his relationship with a man named Mahmoud.138  The mi-
litia apparently captured Mahmoud, and Karouni never saw him again.139 
The court considered the BIA’s precedent, Matter of Toboso-Alfonso,140 es-
tablishing that homosexual status forms the basis of a particular social group 
under the INA, as well as Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) guid-
ance recognizing that persons with HIV or AIDS could constitute a particular 
social group, and the State Department’s conclusion that “[n]othing in interna-
 
129. Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2005). 
130. Hazeldean, supra note 39, at 373, 387; Pfitsch, supra note 39, at 82 (describing implications 
of Romer v. Evans and Lawrence v. Texas on asylum claims brought by gays and lesbians). 
131. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
132. Id. 
133. 399 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2005). 
134. Id. at 1166. 
135. See id. at 1166–67. 
136. Id. at 1168–69. 
137. Id. at 1168. 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
140. 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 822–23 (B.I.A. 1990). 
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tional law can justify the persecution of individuals on the basis of sexual ori-
entation.”141 
Reasoning from these authorities and Lawrence, the court rejected the sta-
tus-conduct distinction urged by the government.142  Specifically, the court re-
jected the government’s argument that any future persecution Karouni faced 
arose from his committing “future homosexual acts” rather than the “status” of 
being homosexual.143  The court noted that the status-conduct distinction im-
posed a “Hobson’s choice” on Karouni—facing persecution or remaining celi-
bate.144  The court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court has regarded intimate 
sexual conduct as an “integral part of human freedom,” protected by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.145  Quoting Lawrence, the court 
noted, “[W]hen sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with an-
other person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more 
enduring.”146  This potential for a “more enduring” personal bond is one reason 
that sexual identity is fundamental to “human identit[y],” and thus, not a char-
acteristic that an asylum seeker should be required to change to qualify for pro-
tection.147  Although the court declined to opine on why protection under U.S. 
constitutional law influenced whether the conduct was protected for asylum 
purposes, it relied on constitutional law to support the view that identity and 
conduct alike are illegitimate grounds for persecution.148 
Courts have used other branches of constitutional jurisprudence to gauge 
the severity of harm as well.  In Shi v. U.S. Attorney General, the Eleventh 
Circuit used Eighth Amendment case law as a benchmark to gauge the severity 
of harm when considering a petition for review of a BIA decision denying asy-
lum.149  The petitioner, Shi, hailed from China, where he allegedly suffered past 
religious persecution.150  Shi alleged that the police “busted up a Christian 
church service” in Shi’s father’s home, arresting his father, Shi, as well as other 
 
141. Karouni, 399 F.3d at 1171. 
142. Id. at 1172. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. at 1173. 
145. Id. (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)). 
146. Id. 
147. Id. 
148. As scholars have noted, asylum law has not uniformly accepted this conclusion.  See Ha-
zeldean, supra note 39, at 387, 395. 
149. Shi v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 707 F.3d 1231, 1232, 1238 (11th Cir. 2013). 
150.  Id. at 1232. 
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worshippers.151  Shi further alleged that he was detained for a week and sub-
jected to interrogations and physical abuse.152  The court noted that Shi had 
been handcuffed to an iron bar and left outside in the rain overnight, causing 
him to fall ill.153  Presented with the question of whether this harm rose to the 
level of persecution, the court drew on Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.154  
The court noted that the Supreme Court has held that “tying a prisoner to a so-
called ‘hitching post’” constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of 
the Eighth Amendment because the hitching post created a “substantial risk of 
physical harm . . . .”155  Specifically, the handcuffs created “unnecessary pain,” 
the device was unnecessarily restrictive over several hours of detention, and the 
whole arrangement unnecessarily exposed the individual to the elements.156  
Noting that “the analog to the Eighth Amendment is in no way perfect,” the 
court nonetheless compared the type of punishment Shi endured, where police 
had handcuffed him “to an iron bar overnight, outdoors and in the rain . . .” 
leading to Shi’s subsequent illness.157  Analyzing this instance of punishment 
alongside the others Shi had alleged, the court concluded that “the totality of 
the circumstances” rose to the level of persecution.  Once the petitioner had 
demonstrated harm amounting to an Eighth Amendment violation, she had 
proven sufficient harm to meet the definition of persecution. 
Cases arising in response to China’s one-child policy illustrate distinct uses 
of constitutional norms.  As noted in the Introduction, the BIA in Matter of 
Chang initially held that the possibility that the one-child policy would violate 
the U.S. Constitution was, by itself, insufficient to demonstrate that the law was 
persecutory.158  The BIA used constitutional law to evaluate the harm applicant 
faced by considering whether the application of a neutral rule could ever 
amount to persecution.  In contrast, federal courts have later considered in some 
detail U.S. constitutional precedents regarding personal autonomy and repro-
ductive freedom, not to gauge the severity of harm, but to determine if opposi-
tion to the one-child policy might amount to a “political opinion.”159 
In Guo Chun Di v. Carroll, the U.S. district court relied extensively on U.S. 
constitutional precedents to determine whether the asylum seeker’s opposition 
 
151.  Id. 
152.  Id. 
153.  Id. 
154.  Id. at 1238. 
155.  Id. 
156.  Id. 
157. Id. at 1238. 
158. Matter of Chang, 20 I. & N. Dec. 38, 46 (B.I.A. 1989). 
159. See Di v. Carroll, 842 F. Supp. 858, 874 (E.D. Va. 1994). 
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to China’s “one child policy” constituted a “political opinion” under the INA.160  
In that case, Guo Chun Di, a citizen of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), 
filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus.161  Di contended that his opposition to 
the PRC’s coercive population control policies constituted a “political opinion” 
for asylum purposes.162  The court analyzed this assertion by examining the 
definition of “political” under Black’s Law Dictionary and then considering 
U.S. constitutional law regarding the fundamental right to bear children.163  Cit-
ing Skinner v. Oklahoma,164 Griswold v. Connecticut,165 and other U.S. consti-
tutional precedents, the court determined that “intrusions upon this fundamental 
right [to reproduce] are looked upon with disfavor.”166  The court explained that 
the Bill of Rights protects the right to make decisions regarding procreation and 
that this right was analogous to other “fundamental rights,” such as freedom of 
religion and freedom of speech, the infringement of which have been recog-
nized as grounds for asylum.167 
The court emphasized its limited use of U.S. constitutional law only for 
analyzing whether Di’s opinion could be characterized as “political” and not to 
suggest that a foreign citizen can establish asylum eligibility “merely by point-
ing to some right guaranteed in the United States Constitution that is not guar-
anteed in his or her respective country.”168  The court further distinguished its 
analysis from mere moral disapproval of the PRC’s population control policies 
or a desire to infringe upon the “foreign policy territory of the political 
branches . . . .”169  Nonetheless, the court’s detailed analysis of reproductive 
freedom under U.S. constitutional law appears to have heavily influenced the 
outcome.  Constitutional analysis led the court to conclude that laws limiting 
reproductive rights are “looked upon with disfavor.”170  U.S. constitutional 
standards futher provided a benchmark for the court to use in evaluating the law 
at issue, and a basis for analogizing the law to restrictions on other fundamental 
 
160. Di, 842 F. Supp. 871–73, overruled by Di v. Moscato, 66 F.3d 315, 1995 WL 543525 (4th 
Cir. 1995). 
161. Id. at 861–62. 
162. Id. at 872. 
163. Id. 
164. 316 U.S. 535, 536, 541 (1942) (holding that state statute requiring “habitual criminals” to 
undergo sterilization violated the Equal Protection Clause). 
165. 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (holding that the state law banning the use of contraceptives 
unconstitutionally violated right to marital privacy). 
166. Di, 842 F. Supp. at 872. 
167. Id. 
168. Id. at 873. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. at 872. 
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rights that have supported asylum eligibility.  Thus, although the court empha-
sized that proving a constitutional violation was not generally a sufficient con-
dition for qualifying for asylum, it appears that proof of a likely constitutional 
violation was sufficient in this particular case.171 
The Fourth Circuit reversed Di, holding that the district court had failed to 
defer sufficiently to the appeals court’s own precedent, Chen Zhou Chai v. Car-
roll,172 which had continued to recognize the authority of the BIA’s decision in 
Matter of Chang.173  The appeals court also determined that even if Guo Chun 
Di succeeded in proving that his opposition to the PRC’s population control 
policy was a “political opinion,”174 he would still have to prove that the PRC 
was persecuting him “for a reason other than to enforce its population control 
policy.”175  The appeals court determined that the district court erred because 
the record lacked such evidence.176  However, the appeals court declined to 
comment on the propriety of the district court’s extensive constitutional analy-
sis. 
In 1996, Congress amended the definition of “refugee” so that persons sub-
ject to the one-child policy were (and currently are) deemed to have been per-
secuted on account of their political opinion.177  In effect, Congress legislated 
the nexus element.178  This amendment has eliminated the scope for the kind of 
constitutional analysis that occurred in Chang and Di.  Nonetheless, the ques-
tion raised as to the proper role of constitutional analysis in asylum cases re-
mains.   
In a final example, a federal court used constitutional law to define a pro-
posed particular social group.179  In Al-Ghorbani v. Holder,180 the Sixth Circuit 
granted in part a petition for review on behalf of two Yemeni brothers and used 
constitutional law to articulate the social group to which they belonged.181  The 
 
171. Id. at 872 (“Because the right to make procreational decisions is a basic liberty right pro-
tected under the Bill of Rights, it is, in that respect, analogous to other fundamental rights that are well-
recognized as legitimate grounds for asylum . . . .”). 
172. 48 F.3d 1331 (4th Cir. 1995). 
173. Di v. Moscato, 66 F.3d 315, 1995 WL 543525, at *2 (4th Cir. 1995). 
174. Id. at *2. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. 
177. INA § 101(a)(42)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B) (2012); see supra note 57. 
178. See MUSALO ET AL., supra note 24, at 275. 
179. See Al-Ghorbani v. Holder, 585 F.3d 980, 997 (6th Cir. 2009). 
180. Id. at 980. 
181. Id. at 996, 999. 
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brothers, Salah and Abdulmuneam, fled to the U.S. because they feared vio-
lence at the hands of a Yemeni general who disapproved of Abdulmuneam’s 
marriage to his daughter Najla.182  The brothers belonged to the “meat-cutter” 
class while the General and his family belonged to a more elite stratum of so-
ciety.183  Although the General’s rage and use of the police apparatus to detain 
and punish the brothers was partly motivated by a personal conflict, many other 
factors shaped the General’s motivation, the court found.184  Specifically, the 
General acted based on the brothers’ social class and their westernized views 
of marriage, particularly their disapproval of discriminatory restrictions on mar-
riage across class lines.185 
In considering the brothers’ proposed social group based on their family 
background and their opposition to Yemeni social norms relating to marriage, 
the court noted that, “In this country, the right to marry is considered funda-
mental.”186  Quoting Loving v. Virginia,187 the court characterized the right to 
marry as “one of the basic civil rights of man.”188  The court then concluded, 
“Persons who are forbidden to marry, or those who oppose discriminatory re-
strictions on marriage, may therefore constitute a particular social group.”189  
Like the district court decision in Di, the court suggested that the status of a 
right as “fundamental”190 under American constitutional law meant that appli-
cants who oppose restrictions on the exercise of those fundamental rights 
abroad shared a political opinion, one that could be the foundation for a partic-
ular social group in some instances.  In this case, petitioners’ views in opposi-
tion to Yemeni restrictive marriage norms helped define a particular social 
group of individuals with westernized views on marriage.191  The court declined 
to analyze the matter at length, instead simply citing Loving and quoting briefly 
from the case to justify the view that opposition to restrictive marriage norms 
can, in fact, define a particular social group.192 
Although the restrictive marriage norms forbidding marriage between clas-
ses would violate the fundamental freedom to marry as understood in American 
 
182. Id. at 985. 
183. Id. at 984. 
184. Id. at 997–98. 
185. Id. at 996–98. 
186. Id. at 996. 
187.   388 U.S. 1 (1967). 




192. See id. 
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constitutional law, the same result could have been reached without any refer-
ence to constitutional law.193  Thus, the heightened importance of the rights at 
stake under U.S. constitutional law was sufficient to justify granting the petition 
for review in this case, but probably unnecessary. 
2. Insufficient 
In direct contrast to the above-described cases, federal courts have also held 
that proving a U.S. constitutional violation does not, without more, establish 
eligibility for asylum.194  These are cases where a constitutional violation is 
“insufficient” to establish asylum eligibility, and more is required of the appli-
cant.  Often, in these cases, the right at stake is important or fundamental under 
U.S. constitutional law, but the government denies the right through economic 
sanctions or a less physically painful form of persecution. 
Specifically, in cases involving parental rights and the right to marry, fed-
eral courts have determined that simply proving a constitutional violation is 
insufficient to establish eligibility for asylum.195  In Romeike v. Holder,196 the 
Sixth Circuit explicitly rejected the relevance of U.S. constitutional law in an-
alyzing whether Germany’s compulsory school attendance law persecuted 
Christian parents who wished to homeschool their children for religious rea-
sons.197  In that case, the parents (Romeikes) had five children whom they 
home-schooled in order to protect them from anti-Christian influence.198  The 
German government imposed fines on the Romeikes for failing to send their 
children to a public or a state-approved private school, and on one occasion, the 
police escorted the Romeike children to school.199  Fellow homeschooling fam-
ilies subsequently assisted the Romeikes in barring the police from escorting 
the children to school, and the police declined to use force.200  The school dis-
trict continued to impose fines, but at no time did the police use force to enforce 
the law against the Romeikes.201  By the time the family fled Germany, the total 
 
193. Id. (citing Faruk v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 940, 943 (9th Cir. 2004) (“We have established that 
persecution for marrying between races, religions . . . or political opinion is persecution on account of 
a protected ground.”)). 
194. See Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[W]e interpret Acosta as recognizing 
that the concept of persecution does not encompass all treatment that our society regards as unfair, 
unjust, or even unlawful or unconstitutional.”). 
195. Romeike v. Holder, 718 F.3d 528, 534 (6th Cir. 2013).  
196.   718 F.3d 528 (6th Cir. 2013).  
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unpaid fines amounted to $9,000.202 
The court noted that, although the U.S. Constitution protects the fundamen-
tal right of parents to guide the upbringing of a child, the absence of this guar-
antee abroad did not “establish[] persecution on religious or any other protected 
ground.”203  The court further noted that asylum applicants cannot establish el-
igibility for asylum merely by demonstrating a violation of U.S. constitutional 
law or “merely by proving a treaty violation.”204  Specifically, the court noted 
that Congress declined to create statutory asylum to provide a “safe haven to 
people living elsewhere in the world who face government strictures that the 
United States Constitution prohibits.”205 
The court analyzed persecution by assuming that a law of general applica-
bility could never amount to persecution.206  Instead, the court analyzed the ap-
plication of the German law in question to the Romeikes and determined that it 
did not constitute persecution because the German government enforced this 
law of general applicability without distinctions or animus based on protected 
grounds.207  In particular, the Romeikes had failed to demonstrate that the com-
pulsory school attendance law was applied selectively to religious homeschool-
ers or that homeschoolers are punished more severely than others who violate 
the compulsory school attendance law.208  Thus, without evidence of either se-
lective enforcement or discriminatory punishment, the Romeikes could not pre-
vail, and the violation of U.S. constitutional norms was insufficient to justify 
granting the petition for review.209 
Other courts have similarly rejected the sufficiency of U.S. constitutional 
violations to demonstrate asylum eligibility in cases based on the right to 
marry.210  In Chen v. Ashcroft,211 the Third Circuit assessed whether the BIA’s 
decision in C-Y-Z, which recognized derivative asylum claims based on forced 
sterilization of a spouse but not an unmarried partner, irrationally and arbitrarily 
 
202. Id. 
203. Id. at 534 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 
268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400–01 (1923)). 
204. Id. 
205. Id. at 530. 
206. Id. at 534 (characterizing argument that compulsory-attendance law violates fundamental 
rights as having an “Achilles’ heel”—namely that persecution must be “on account of a protected 
ground.”).  Noting that the petitioners had failed to prove nexus, the court then used this failure as proof 
of lack of persecution.  Id.  The court’s analysis, thus, appears to conflate persecution and nexus. 
207. Id. at 535. 
208. Id. at 532. 
209. See id. at 532, 534. 
210. See Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 230 (3d Cir. 2004). 
211. 381 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 2004). 
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excluded unmarried partners who would have married but for the PRC’s “in-
flated minimum marriage age . . . .”212  Chen and his fiancée, Chen Gui, began 
living together in 1994 at the ages of 19 and 18, respectively.213  In 1995, Chen 
Gui learned she was pregnant, and the couple sought a marriage license.214  Of-
ficials denied their application because Chinese law required men to be at least 
25 years old and women at least 23 years old to marry.215  Chen alleged that 
government officials “soon became aware of the pregnancy” and informed the 
couple that the pregnancy would have to be aborted.216  Instead of complying 
with the order, the couple went into hiding.217  Chen refused to reveal Chen 
Gui’s whereabouts and was attacked.218  He then fled China, leaving Chen Gui 
living at his parents’ home.219  He later learned that she was forced to have an 
abortion during the eighth month of pregnancy.220 
Without deciding the permissibility of C-Y-Z as an interpretation of the 
1996 Amendment to the INA, the court determined that the BIA’s decision to 
limit C-Y-Z to married couples was permissible, even though some couples 
were excluded from marrying in PRC due to age restrictions and thus could not 
benefit from the C-Y-Z rule.221  In evaluating petitioner’s claim, the court dis-
cussed U.S. constitutional law’s recognition of marriage as a fundamental right, 
as well as various international human rights instruments regarding marriage.222  
It then noted that the states within the United States are authorized to regulate 
the age of marriage, that many set the age of marriage much younger than the 
PRC policy, and that these laws are constitutional.223  Citing precedent such as 
Zablocki v. Redhail,224  as well as international legal support for “[l]aws setting 
 
212. Id. at 222. 








221. Id. at 222. 
222. Id. at 230 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)); id. at n.12 (citing Convention on 
Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of Marriages, art. 2, Dec. 9, 1964, 
521 U.N.T.S. 231, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/MinimumAgeForMarriage.a
spx [https://perma.cc/2EG3-ZS85]) (“States Parties to the present Convention shall take legislative 
action to specify a minimum age for marriage.”). 
223. Id. 
224. 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978). 
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reasonable minimum marriage ages,” the court confirmed the power of the gov-
ernment to regulate marriage consistently with the right to marry.225  It noted, 
however, that the states as well as most other countries generally set the mini-
mum age much younger than the PRC, thus recognizing that the PRC’s law 
burdened the right to marry even if it did not violate it.226 
After considering these points, the court noted that proving a constitutional 
violation would not be sufficient to demonstrate eligibility for asylum.227  It 
noted, “[a] law or practice, however, does not necessarily rise to the level of 
‘persecution’ simply because it does not satisfy American constitutional stand-
ards or diverges from the pattern followed by other countries.”228  The court 
explained that the BIA was not “bound to conclude that minimums of 23 and 
25 amounted to persecution.”229  In particular, the court could not conclude that 
“requiring a person to wait until reaching the age of 23 or 25 is so far outside 
the accepted realm of human decency as to constitute persecution.”230 
In sum, the court considered U.S. constitutional law, international human 
rights law, the laws of foreign jurisdictions, and notions of “human decency” 
in determining that the law in question was not inherently persecutory.231  The 
court apparently regarded the PRC’s law as anomalous, but not egregious, and 
likely not even unconstitutional by U.S. standards.  At the same time, the court 
suggested that even if the law were impermissible under U.S. law, it would not 
be inherently persecutory for that reason alone.232  As a result, a violation of 
U.S. constitutional law would be insufficient to establish a claim for refugee 
status.  Chen is a softer example of this view because, unlike Romeike, where 
the Sixth Circuit conceded that Germany’s compulsory school law would likely 
violate the First Amendment if adopted in the United States,233 Chen involved 
laws that would probably not be deemed unconstitutional if adopted here.  Chen 
states rather than demonstrates the insufficiency of a constitutional violation to 
support asylum eligibility.234 
 
225. Chen, 381 F.3d at 230. 
226. Id. 
227. Id. at 230–31. 
228. Id. 
229. Id. at 231. 
230. Id. 
231. Id. at 230–31. 
232. Id. 
233. Romeike v. Holder, 718 F.3d 528, 530 (6th Cir. 2013) (“Had the Romeikes lived in America 
at the time, they would have had a lot of legal authority to work with in countering [their] prosecution.”) 
(citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213–14, (1972); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 
534–35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400–01 (1923)). 
234. Chen, 381 F.3d at 230–231. 
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Cases where constitutional violations were sufficient to prove the persecu-
tion or nexus elements of a claim for asylum—Canas-Segovia, Karouni, 
Kazemzedah, Di, Shi, and Al-Ghorbani—generally involved more severe harm.  
In those cases, the harm at stake was undoubtedly severe: imprisonment, forced 
sterilization, and torture or death, respectively.235  These cases all involve sym-
pathetic facts and the egregious, physically painful violation of fundamental 
rights under U.S. constitutional law.  The outcomes of these cases follow from 
the combination of the threat or prior experience of severe harm and the in-
fringement of a U.S. constitutional right. 
On the other hand, in the cases where courts deemed a constitutional viola-
tion insufficient to establish eligibility for asylum, the harm at stake was gen-
erally less severe—for example, the economic sanctions for homeschooling in 
Romeike236 or fines incurred for marrying early in Chen.237  Although religious 
freedom and the right to marry are core constitutional rights, the harms leveled 
against the applicants for attempting to exercise these rights was noticeably less 
severe than what applicants faced in the “sufficient” cases.  Ultimately, where 
more physically painful harms awaited the applicants, courts seemed more 
likely to recognize that persecution had occurred or was likely to occur on ac-
count of a protected characteristic and deem proof of a constitutional violation 
sufficient to prove these elements as well.238  Thus, the distinction between the 
“sufficient” and “insufficient” cases can be understood, at least in part, in terms 
of the severity of physical harm the applicant suffered.  Courts may be willing 
to use constitutional law to augment otherwise sound rationales for meritorious 
asylum claims, but they are not willing to use constitutional law to resolve 
weaker claims favorably for the applicant.  This approach makes sense, but the 
ambiguity surrounding whether constitutional norms are used merely in dicta 
or instead are central to the reasoning of a case can lead to confusion for both 
courts and litigants alike. 
B. The second distinction: necessary versus unnecessary 
In the second set of cases, courts have regarded proof of a constitutional 
 
235.  Kazemzadeh v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 577 F.3d 1341, 1346 (11th Cir. 2009); Al-Ghorbani v. 
Holder, 585 F.3d 980, 984 (6th Cir. 2009); Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2005); Canas-
Segovia v. INS, 902 F.2d 717 (9th Cir. 1990); Di v. Carroll, 842 F. Supp. 858, 862 (E.D. Va. 1994). 
236.  News sources suggest that the Romeikes also faced losing custody of their children, but the 
Sixth Circuit declined to mention this possibility.  See, e.g., Ben Waldron, Home Schooling German 
Family Allowed to Stay in US (Mar. 5, 2014), http://abcnews.go.com/US/home-schooling-german-
family-allowed-stay-us/story?id=22788876. 
237. Chen, 381 F.3d at 231. 
238. The outcomes of these cases suggest a hierarchy of severity placing death, imprisonment, 
and bodily injury over economic harm.  See Rempell, supra note 39, at 311–12. 
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violation as either necessary or unnecessary to proving eligibility for asylum.  
On the one hand, some courts essentially require asylum applicants to prove 
that the harm suffered violates the U.S. Constitution in order to demonstrate 
eligibility for asylum.  These cases suggest that a constitutional violation is es-
sential or necessary to qualify for asylum.  In direct contrast, courts elsewhere 
suggest that proving a constitutional violation is unnecessary to prove eligibility 
for asylum. 
The “necessary” and “unnecessary” cases are uncommon, and to under-
stand why, it is important to consider how constitutional analogies or arguments 
would arise in these cases.  If a court states that an asylum applicant cannot 
prevail without proving a constitutional violation, the government would have 
been the entity to advance that argument.  (It would undermine the applicant’s 
interest to argue that she could not possibly prevail without showing a consti-
tutional violation.)  Similarly, if a court states that an asylum applicant can pre-
vail, despite failing to prove a violation of the U.S. Constitution, the govern-
ment most probably pressed for a contrary conclusion.239  There are few 
opportunities for the government to raise these arguments in the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals, for the government cannot petition for review from asylum grants be-
low.240  Petitioners, on the other hand, are seeking the appellate court to grant 
their petition based on the BIA’s errors, and they would have nothing to lose 
by raising novel arguments based on constitutional norms.  In light of these 
procedural facts, cases suggesting that proof of a constitutional violation is nec-
essary or unnecessary are relatively uncommon. 
1. Necessary 
The Seventh Circuit has drawn on constitutional norms to define key terms 
in the refugee definition, and in so doing, has used these norms to establish 
necessary conditions for asylum.  For example, in Chen v. Holder, the court 
drew on First Amendment jurisprudence to analyze the petitioner’s claim of 
persecution on account of her capitalist views. 241  The petitioner alleged that 
the government had razed a dozen homes to construct a military building, but 
had promised the displaced families that they would provide “similarly sized 
plots of land . . . pay for construction of new houses within three months . . . 
 
239. The applicant would be unlikely to invoke constitutional law where his or her circumstances 
do not demonstrate a violation because it would undermine the applicant’s case regarding the severity 
of the harm suffered. 
240. INA § 242(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) (2012) (permitting judicial review of orders of re-
moval). 
241. Chen v. Holder, 607 F.3d 511, 513 (7th Cir. 2010). 
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[and] provide rent for transitional housing.”242  Although the government paid 
the rent, it reneged on the other aspects of its promise.  Accordingly, Chen filed 
suit, but the court dismissed her suit, and government officials soon came look-
ing to arrest her. 
The BIA determined that Chen’s suit “did not advance a political position,” 
and thus, she had not been persecuted on account of one.243  On review, the 
Seventh Circuit considered whether litigation might constitute political expres-
sion and turned to First Amendment jurisprudence.  First, it noted that time, 
place, and manner restrictions are independent from the speaker’s particular 
views, and that China may have legitimately decided that litigation is not an 
appropriate vehicle for expressing political views.244  In addition, the court 
noted that even under U.S. law, constitutional protection for litigation does not 
extend to frivolous suits; a plaintiff can be found liable for abuse of process if 
the plaintiff’s suit is “objectively baseless.”245  The Seventh Circuit noted that 
Chen’s suit fell into this category, as she sought to assert her parents’ rights to 
land; unsurprisingly, the local court had peremptorily dismissed her suit.  The 
Seventh Circuit then stated, “If courts of this nation would deem such a suit 
frivolous and sanctionable—and not an impingement on the rights of political 
opinion sheltered by the first amendment—it cannot be political persecution for 
other nations to think likewise.”246  Thus, the court used First Amendment 
standards to define “political position” and a failure to satisfy these standards 
doomed the petitioner’s asylum claim.247 
In another pair of asylum cases involving claims by government workers 
based on persecution on account of political opinion and social group, the Sev-
enth Circuit used First Amendment jurisprudence to articulate the contours of 
“political opinion.”  An applicant’s inability to demonstrate that her opinion 
would be protected under the standards of the First Amendment meant that the 
applicant’s claim for asylum necessarily failed.248  In those cases, an asylum 
 
242.   Id. at 512. 
243. Id. 
244. Id. at 513. 
245. Id. 
246. Id. 
247. Id. at 514.  The court remanded to the BIA, however, to consider whether the warrant for 
Chen’s arrest—a disproportionate response in the court’s view—suggested that the government may 
have been “setting out to muzzle a political opponent” rather than simply enforcing Chinese law on the 
proper use of the courts. Id. 
248. Musabelliu v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 991, 996 (7th Cir. 2006); Pavlyk v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 
1082, 1092 (7th Cir. 2006). 
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seeker could not succeed absent a showing that the harm she suffered on ac-
count of a protected characteristic would have—at the very least—amounted to 
a First Amendment violation had it occurred in the U.S.249 
In these cases, the Seventh Circuit explicitly discussed competing views of 
the practice of relying on U.S. constitutional norms in asylum adjudications.250  
In Musabelliu v. Gonzales,251 the Seventh Circuit determined that an Albanian 
former colonel had not suffered persecution on account of his political opinion 
when he lost his job after meeting with a public prosecutor about military cor-
ruption.252  The court determined that Musabelliu’s claims failed for a number 
of reasons, including that the opinions he expressed were not “political” under 
First Amendment jurisprudence.253  Acknowledging that whistle-blowing can 
constitute a political opinion, the court observed that Musabelliu neither cam-
paigned for the ouster of any leader nor expressed his views in a public fo-
rum.254  Instead, he merely shared his views with his superior officers within 
the chain of command, “as part of his official duties.”255  Given the limited 
protection for such views under First Amendment law, the court deemed it “im-
plausible to treat the reference to ‘political opinion’ [in the INA] as necessarily 
encompassing forms of expression that may not have constitutional protection 
even in the United States—and that are, if protected at all, at or near the outer 
limit of the first amendment’s coverage.”256  The court doubted that the INA 
would protect the expression of opinions abroad that are not constitutionally 
protected here.257  Thus, the court suggested that a foreign nation must violate 
a U.S. constitutional norm before that court would even consider granting a 
petition for review.  The lack of such a violation in this case, among other fac-
tors, doomed the application. 
Similarly, in Pavlyk v. Gonzales,258 the Seventh Circuit determined that a 
former Ukrainian prosecutor’s mistreatment for investigating governmental 
corruption also did not amount to persecution on account of political opinion 
that would entitle the applicant to withholding of removal.259  The applicant, 
 
249. Musabelliu, 442 F.3d at 996; Pavlyk, 469 F.3d at 1092 (Cudahy, J. concurring). 
250. See Musabelliu, 442 F.3d at 996; see also Pavlyk, 469 F.3d at 1089. 
251. 442 F.3d at 991. 
252. Id. at 993–94. 
253. Id. at 995–96. 
254. Id. 
255. Id. at 996. 
256. Id. (citation omitted). 
257. Id. 
258. 469 F.3d 1082 (7th Cir. 2006). 
259. Id. at 1086–87, 1090 (noting that Pavlyk’s asylum claim was untimely, and thus, evaluating 
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Volodymyr Pavlyk, served in the Soviet army and worked as a prosecutor in 
Ukraine, where he pursued controversial cases.260  In the course of his work, he 
and his family received threats, and someone shot at him as he was leaving 
work one night.261  At some point, Ukraine charged Pavlyk with bribery and 
issued a warrant for his arrest.262 
Pavlyk claimed that the warrant was a form of retaliation for his controver-
sial investigations, and that he had been and would continue to be persecuted 
on account of his membership in the particular social group consisting of 
“Ukrainian prosecutors.”263  The court reasoned that, even assuming the threats 
amounted to persecution, Pavlyk could not prove nexus to a protected charac-
teristic.264  The proposed social group was not united by an immutable charac-
teristic,265 as one could resign and no longer be a Ukrainian prosecutor, nor 
could Pavlyk prove that the persecution occurred because of his membership in 
this group.266  Pavlyk also argued that he was persecuted on account of his po-
litical opinion, but the court determined that Pavlyk had not engaged in any 
“classic political activities.”267  Moreover, although whistle-blowers may qual-
ify for asylum, the court noted that Pavlyk had not sought to bring the results 
of the investigation to the public “in quest of a political decision.”268  Instead, 
he was simply doing his job as a prosecutor.269  Thus, as in Musabelliu, the 
court found no basis for relief.270 
In concluding that Pavlyk was not eligible for protection, the court noted in 
dicta that even First Amendment jurisprudence did not protect public officials 
from retaliation when speaking “within an agency’s hierarchy on an issue of 
public concern, as part of their duties.”271  The court then cited Garcetti v. Ce-
ballos,272 where the Supreme Court held that public officials under such cir-
cumstances are not speaking as citizens entitled to First Amendment protection, 
 
only withholding of removal and Convention Against Torture (CAT)). 
260. Id. at 1085. 
261. Id. 
262. Id. 
263. Id. at 1088. 
264. Id. 
265. Id. at 1088–89. 
266. Id. 
267. Id. at 1089. 
268. Id. (quoting Musabelliu v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 991, 996 (7th Cir. 2006)). 
269. Id. 
270. In Pavlyk, the court determined that it lacked jurisdiction over Pavlyk’s asylum claim, thus 
leaving only withholding and CAT.  Id. at 1086. 
271. Id. at 1089. 
272. 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
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but as employees speaking “pursuant to their official duties . . . .”273  The court 
determined that Pavlyk’s speech similarly did not constitute political speech, 
and that “it would be implausible to offer broader protection for speech to an 
alien under the immigration laws than is provided to citizens under the First 
Amendment.”274 
Judge Cudahy, concurring, took issue with the majority’s use of First 
Amendment jurisprudence to establish a necessary condition for offering pro-
tection under refugee law.275   
It seems to me that this importation of our First Amendment’s 
‘extra-employment’ condition for protection of speech into 
the Immigration and Nationality Act’s conditions for asy-
lum . . . ignores the plain language of the Act’s relevant pro-
visions, which require only that ‘the alien’s life or freedom 
would be threatened . . . because of the alien’s . . . political 
opinion.’276   
Noting that the Act protects not only the expression of opinion, but the holding 
of one, Judge Cudahy noted that the Act could encompass protection for any 
type of expression, including a public employee’s expression of a political opin-
ion in the course of his or official duties.277  Judge Cudahy noted that asylum 
applicants claiming political persecution generally must demonstrate participa-
tion in “classically political activities,” but that some applicants may perform 
public duties that “carry an obvious political implication that invites persecu-
tion,” such as an election commissioner tasked with certifying an election.278  
In such cases, it may be possible for an applicant to demonstrate persecution on 
account of his or her political opinion simply by expressing an opinion in the 
course of his or her official duties.279 
Rather than finding the more expansive protection under asylum law “im-
plausible,” Judge Cudahy defended its reasonableness in light of the different 
purposes of First Amendment protection and refugee protection.280  While the 
First Amendment seeks to protect competing interests in a public employee’s 
 
273. Pavlyk, 469 F.3d at 1089 (citing Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421). 
274. Id. 
275. Id. at 1092 (Cudahy, J., concurring). 
276. Id. 
277. Id. 
278. Id. at 1092–93. 
279. Id. at 1092. 
280. Id. 
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freedom of speech as well as the government’s interest in controlling its em-
ployees’ conduct, the INA is not concerned with “fine-tun[ing]” this balance.281  
Instead, it seeks to protect aliens from “persecution,” which Judge Cudahy char-
acterized as a more severe form of harm than what a public employee in the 
U.S. would face in retaliation for speech in his or her official capacity.282  The 
distinct purposes of the First Amendment and U.S. asylum law led Judge 
Cudahy to reject the majority’s conclusion that asylum law could offer protec-
tion for a class of speech no broader than what citizens enjoy under the Consti-
tution.283  On this view, the First Amendment’s “minimalist” floor of protection 
should not function as a ceiling in asylum law.  Proving a constitutional viola-
tion, while seemingly necessary to the majority, was unnecessary to the con-
curring judge. 
Chen, the Third Circuit case involving China’s laws establishing a mini-
mum age for marriage, discussed above, also belongs in this discussion.  The 
court there focused on the fundamental right to marriage, but it also noted the 
rational basis for regulating the age of marriage and suggested that slightly 
higher minimum age requirements were neither unconstitutional nor persecu-
tory.284  Although the court observed that not all laws that would be unconsti-
tutional under U.S. law are necessarily persecutory, it also suggested that until 
a law was unconstitutional, it would not be persecutory either.285  By focusing 
on the authority of states within the United States to regulate the minimum age 
of marriage, the court suggested that the Chinese law would quite likely be 
constitutional under U.S. standards.286  Thus, Chen is best characterized as a 
case illustrating that a constitutional violation is insufficient but also necessary 
to demonstrate eligibility for asylum. 
2. Unnecessary 
In contrast to the above-described cases, the vast majority of asylum deci-
sions do not require an asylum seeker to prove a U.S. constitutional violation 
in order to demonstrate eligibility for asylum.  Judge Cudahy’s concurring opin-
ion in Pavlyk, discussed above, is probably the best example of this view.287  





284. Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 230 (3d Cir. 2004). 
285. Id. at 231. 
286. See id. at 230. 
287. Pavlyk v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 1082 (7th Cir. 2006). 
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opine on all the requirements that are unnecessary to its decision, courts have 
implied this position most strongly in cases relating to protection for LGBT 
asylum seekers.288 
Initially, asylum law offered more extensive protections to gays and lesbi-
ans than did constitutional law.289  The BIA’s decision in Toboso-Alfonso es-
tablished that “homosexual” status could constitute a particular social group, 
and that persecution on that basis would render an individual eligible for asy-
lum.290  Years later, in Hernandez-Montiel v. INS,291 the Ninth Circuit deter-
mined that an asylum seeker who was a gay male with a female sexual identity 
in Mexico was persecuted “on account of his membership in a particular social 
group.”292 
In Hernandez-Montiel, the court held that a particular social group could 
consist either of a voluntary association or a group united by an “innate charac-
teristic that is so fundamental to the identities or consciences of its members 
that members either cannot or should not be required to change it.”293  Applying 
this definition to Hernandez-Montiel’s proposed particular social group, the 
court concluded that the community of gay men with female sexual identities 
in Mexico was a “small, readily identifiable group.”294  Moreover, the court 
concluded that Hernandez-Montiel’s female sexual identity was “so fundamen-
tal” to his human identity that he should not be required to change it.295  The 
court rejected the BIA’s determination that Hernandez-Montiel was persecuted 
because of his manner of dress, rather than because of his identity as a gay male, 
and further noted that Hernandez-Montiel could not change “his identity as 
quickly as the taxi drivers in [the seminal decision of] Acosta can change jobs” 
simply because he could change how he dressed.296 
Although the court did not expressly invoke U.S. constitutional principles 
in its ruling, it noted that U.S. precedent upholding the constitutionality of anti-
 
288. See Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 822–23 (B.I.A. 1990). 
289. Hazeldean, supra note 39, at 373. 
290. Matter of Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 822–23. 
291. 225 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2000). 
292. Id. at 1087, 1091.  This was a time when Bowers v. Hardwick was the law of the land, and 
the Supreme Court deemed anti-sodomy laws consistent with the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses of the U.S. Constitution.  Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence 
v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
293. Hernandez-Montiel, 225 F.3d at 1093. 
294. Id. at 1094 (quoting Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986)). 
295. Id. 
296. Id. at 1094, 1096. 
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sodomy laws had no relevance to Hernandez-Montiel’s claim.297  Specifically, 
Hernandez-Montiel was not claiming that he was persecuted for violating anti-
sodomy laws, but that he suffered persecution when the police raped him 
twice.298  As a result, the court divorced consideration of the then-highly limited 
U.S. constitutional protections for gay rights from the potentially more expan-
sive protection warranted under asylum law.299  In this way, the court suggested 
that proving a U.S. constitutional violation was unnecessary, and that the ap-
plicant might still qualify for asylum, even if the applicant’s status or identity 
lacked constitutional protection.300  Scholars have characterized Hernandez-
Montiel as a crucial decision for these reasons.301 
Similarly, in Ma v. Ashcroft,302 the Ninth Circuit determined that the BIA 
erred in ruling that Congress authorized derivative asylum applications based 
on forced abortion or sterilization only for couples in the PRC whose marriages 
were registered.303  Although the court did not explicitly discuss U.S. constitu-
tional law, the court considered the government’s argument that it was bound 
to follow China’s marriage policy.304  The court ruled, “While ordinarily we 
respect the marriage rules and regulations of foreign nations, including the es-
tablishment of a minimum [marriage] age, here the entire purpose of Congress’s 
amendment to the asylum statute is to give relief to victims of China’s oppres-
sive population control policy.”305  Instead of appealing to the “fundamental 
right” to marry, which the court in Chen had considered, the court here noted 
simply that the BIA’s interpretation would “contravene” Congress’s purpose of 
protecting individuals from the oppressive one-child policy, a part of which is 
the ban on underage marriage.306  The right to marriage has an obvious consti-
tutional dimension, which other appellate courts have discussed.307  Thus, one 
can infer from the court’s failure to explicitly discuss constitutional norms that 
it regarded proof of a constitutional violation as unnecessary to establish eligi-
bility for asylum.308 
 
297. Id. at 1098 (citing Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196). 
298. Id. 
299. Id. at 1098. 
300. See id. 
301. See Hazeldean, supra note 39, at 387. 
302. 361 F.3d 553 (9th Cir. 2004). 
303. Id. at 561. 
304. Id. 
305. Id. (citation omitted). 
306. Id. 
307. Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 230 (3d Cir. 2004). 
308. It is also possible that U.S. constitutional norms may have appeared in “phantom” form in 
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Cases in which proving a constitutional violation was a necessary condition 
are harder to reconcile with cases and opinions finding it unnecessary.  The 
asylum seekers in Musabelliu, Pavlyk and Chen, whose petitions for review 
were denied, faced a range of harms, from purely economic (Musabelliu lost 
his job)309 to threats of bodily injury (Pavlyk was shot at) 310 and arrest (one of 
the harms awaiting Chen).311  However, none of the applicants suffered bodily 
harm, and the courts declined to conclude that a reasonable factfinder would be 
compelled to find that these applicants had suffered persecution or had a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of a protected characteristic.312  Alt-
hough persecution does not require physical harm,313 these courts may have 
regarded the absence of bodily harm as problematic.314  One might conclude 
(albeit, speculatively) that the severity of harm (or lack thereof) helps explain 
the court’s ready use of any and all tools, including constitutional law, to justify 
limiting relief. 
However, the cases and opinions that regard proof of a constitutional vio-
lation as unnecessary to demonstrating eligibility for asylum also involve a 
range of harms, and thus the “necessary” and “unnecessary” cases cannot be 
distinguished so easily based on the severity of harm alleged by the applicants.  
Hernandez-Montiel involved police sexual violence, a serious form of physical 
abuse that clearly meets the severity threshold of a number of conceptions of 
persecution.315  In contrast, the harm suffered by the applicant in Pavlyk was 
less severe.  Nonetheless, Judge Cudahy openly critiqued the Pavlyk majority’s 
use of the First Amendment in the asylum context, despite the less serious na-
ture of the harm Pavlyk had suffered.  Judge Cudahy articulated a view of the 
relationship of constitutional law to asylum law independent of the severity of 
harm alleged.316  Characterizing Pavklyk for a moment (based on Judge 
Cudahy’s concurring opinion) and Hernandez-Montiel both as “unnecessary” 
 
this case.  That is, the court may have avoided discussing the importance of the right to marry under 
constitutional law by casting the decision as a matter of statutory interpretation and using constitutional 
norms only in “phantom” form.  Cf. Motomura, supra note 33, at 564–65 (noting that phantom consti-
tutional norms have produced “much more sympathetic” outcomes for noncitizens than the “interpre-
tation of statutes in light of the expressly applicable constitutional immigration law based on plenary 
power.”). 
309. Musabelliu v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 991, 993 (7th Cir. 2006). 
310. Pavlyk v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 1082, 1085 (7th Cir. 2006). 
311.   Chen v. Ashcroft, 381 F.3d 221, 223 (3d Cir. 2004). 
312. Musabelliu, 442 F.3d at 994; Pavlyk, 469 F.3d at 1091; Chen 381, F.3d at 233. 
313. ANKER, supra note 19, § 4:1. 
314. See Musabelliu, 442 F.3d at 996; see also Pavlyk, 469 F.3d at 1091; Chen 381, F.3d at 233. 
315. Hernandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1099 (9th Cir. 2000). 
316. Pavlyk, 469 F.3d at 1092. 
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cases, it is notable that they lack a unifying feature such as severity of harm.  
As a result, a neat reconciliation of the “necessary” and “unnecessary” cases 
remains elusive. 
IV. OUTLINING A PATH FORWARD 
The current practice of using constitutional norms in asylum adjudications 
is complex and inconsistent.  It reveals that constitutional norms play diverse 
roles in the asylum context.  Courts and litigants use constitutional norms for 
different purposes, sometimes as doctrine to gauge the severity of harm, and 
other times as guidance on the meaning of key terms such as “political opin-
ion.”317  The most problematic aspect of existing practice is the use of constitu-
tional norms to establish necessary or sufficient conditions for relief. 
One risk of using any doctrine out of context is that the visiting doctrine 
may distort that of the home field,318 and in the asylum context, this can mean 
a contraction or expansion of protection that is inconsistent with asylum prece-
dent.  Specifically, Pavlyk, Musabelliu, and Chen from the Seventh Circuit il-
lustrate the risks of using constitutional norms to establish a necessary condi-
tion for asylum.  These cases demonstrate the view that asylum law can never 
provide broader protection than the Constitution.319  This view is problematic 
for two reasons.  First, making proof of a constitutional violation a prerequisite 
to asylum eligibility essentially adds an element to the statutory definition of 
refugee; thus, not only would an applicant have to satisfy the standard articu-
lated in INA § 101(a)(42), but he or she would also need to demonstrate that 
the harm suffered would amount to a constitutional violation if it had occurred 
here.  Such a result makes this approach problematic as a matter of statutory 
interpretation. 
Second, this approach does not appreciate the distinct purposes of asylum 
law and constitutional law.320  Although both areas of law deal in civil and po-
litical rights, they do so for very different ends.  Asylum law explains who is a 
refugee and under what circumstances a country is obligated to protect refu-
gees.321  Unlike international human rights law, asylum law does not regulate 
 
317. I thank Hiroshi Motomura for articulating this distinction. 
318. Cf. Motomura, supra note 33, at 549 (“[S]tatutory interpretation confuses and contorts the 
law when the interpreting court relies for an extended period on constitutional norms that are doctri-
nally ‘improper’ in the sense that they do not control in cases which explicitly involve interpreting the 
Constitution.”). 
319. See Musabelliu v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 991, 996 (7th Cir. 2006); see also Pavlyk, 469 F.3d 
at 1092. 
320. Pavlyk, 469 F.3d at 1092 (Cudahy, J., concurring). 
321. INA § 101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012). 
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persecutors and does not provide for their punishment or articulate standards 
for their behavior.322  It does not establish a set of rights for individuals to enjoy 
in their home countries (although it does articulate the rights of refugees in their 
haven states).323  Constitutional law, on the other hand, articulates limits on 
government action or inaction and provides standards for the behavior of gov-
ernment agents.324  It speaks both to government actors and individual persons 
in the United States, and it articulates the scope of individual rights and the 
limits on government infringement on protected activities such as political ex-
pression, religious belief, and so forth.325 
Thus, one can imagine a situation in which a right protected by the U.S. 
Constitution is not violated, but the harm is egregious enough to amount to 
“persecution” and is inflicted on account of a protected characteristic, thus sat-
isfying the persecution and nexus requirements.  For example, Judge Cudahy 
considered the situation of an official in a foreign country whose job it is to 
certify elections, and who might face political persecution for simply doing his 
or her job.326  Others in that society might impute a particular political opinion 
to the official, even though he or she has not exercised a First Amendment right 
to engage in protected speech.327  Although the official would not have suffered 
the equivalent of a constitutional violation, he or she would have suffered per-
secution on account of a protected characteristic.  This example illustrates that 
using constitutional analysis to justify limiting eligibility for asylum is prob-
lematic, substantively and methodologically. 
Similarly, using constitutional norms to establish a sufficient condition is 
problematic because not all constitutional violations are also violations of fun-
damental human rights.  Take, for example, the American constitutional re-
quirement that the government provide notice and an opportunity to be heard 
before taking an individual’s property, including government benefits for the 
indigent.328  If another country were to implement a social welfare system that 
authorized the termination of benefits without notice or an opportunity to be 
 
322. In re S-P-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 486, 492–94 (B.I.A. 1996); ANKER, supra note 19, § 4:11 (“[R]ef-
ugee law, unlike international human rights law, is not concerned with accountability per se or chang-
ing the behavior of states . . . .”). 
323. Cf. Refugee Convention, supra note 17, arts. 12–34 (addressing refugees’ juridical status, 
gainful employment, and administrative matters). 
324. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 28, § 1.1 (discussing protection of individual liberties as one 
of the Constitution’s purposes). 
325. See id. 
326. Pavlyk v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 1082, 1092–93 (7th Cir. 2006) (Cudahy, J., concurring). 
327. Id. 
328. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268 (1970). 
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heard, few would argue that the law is inherently persecutory or violates fun-
damental rights, even though such a scheme would be unconstitutional under 
Due Process Clause precedent.329 
Despite these concerns with using constitutional law to establish necessary 
or sufficient conditions for asylum eligibility, courts should not abandon the 
practice of invoking constitutional norms altogether.  Constitutional law offers 
judges a robust body of law to consider in defining the contours of political and 
civil rights, the legitimacy of state action, and protected classifications.330  It 
has a long history of influencing international human rights law.331  Moreover, 
judges are reluctant to interpret and apply international law, 332 and in some 
circumstances, constitutional law may serve as an appropriate surrogate for 
such considerations.  Finally, excising constitutional norms from asylum law 
would require judges to artificially limit the widespread influence of constitu-
tional norms in American legal culture.333 
More specifically, the transparent use of constitutional norms has the po-
tential to enrich courts’ analyses of asylum claims.  Two cases in particular 
illustrate how the failure to consider relevant constitutional norms can impov-
erish the analyses of such claims.  In a case involving gay rights, a federal ap-
peals court declined to consider recent developments in constitutional protec-
tion for LGBT persons.  In Kimumwe v. Gonzales, the Eighth Circuit 
determined that an asylum applicant from Zimbabwe had suffered expulsion 
from school and arrest by the police not for his “status” of being gay, but for 
his prohibited sexual conduct with other male students.334  In the first incident, 
Kimumwe at age 12 “lured” another boy to have sex with him at his school; 
 
329. Although economic harm can constitute persecution, it has to be “deliberately imposed as a 
form of punishment and it results in sufficiently severe deprivations.” ANKER, supra note 19, § 4:28 
n.4 (citing Zhang v. Gonzales, 495 F.3d 773, 776–77 (7th Cir. 2007)). 
330. For a discussion of the similarity of the analysis of suspect classifications under the Equal 
Protection Clause and “immutable characteristics” defining particular social groups under asylum law, 
see Anthony R. Enriquez,  Note, Assuming Responsibility for Who You Are: the Right to Choose “Im-
mutable” Identity Characteristics, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 373, 391–92 (2013). 
331. Henkin, supra note 26, at 415 (“Americans were prominent among the architects and build-
ers of international human rights, and American constitutionalism was a principal inspiration and 
model for them.”). 
332. Farbenblum, supra note 17, at 1117 (“But federal judges often perceive that if the meaning 
of a Convention provision is not clear on its face, then it is indeterminate or not amenable to systematic 
interpretation.”). 
333. Motomura, supra note 33, at 561 (noting that constitutional norms serve “as the unstated 
background context that informs our interpretation of statutes and other subconstitutional texts” and 
that “contemporary constitutional law is a significant element of the legal culture that judges inevita-
bly . . . absorb and rely upon . . . .”). 
334. Kimumwe v. Gonzales, 431 F.3d 319, 321–22 (8th Cir. 2005). 
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when the boy complained, the school expelled Kimumwe on account of the 
school’s policy prohibiting all forms of sexual conduct, heterosexual and ho-
mosexual.335  The second incident, years later, arose when Kimumwe and a 
male classmate became drunk and had sex in college.336  The other boy com-
plained to the school authorities after the encounter, and the police arrested Ki-
mumwe and detained him for two months without charges.337  After an ally 
bribed the police, the authorities released Kimumwe.338 
The majority acknowledged that Zimbabwe’s government had “espoused 
harsh anti-homosexual rhetoric,” but suggested that Kimumwe had not been 
mistreated for being gay, but for prohibited sexual conduct.339  Accordingly, the 
court denied the petition for review.340  The dissent accepted the status-conduct 
distinction but emphasized aspects of the record that demonstrated that Ki-
mumwe had been persecuted for his homosexual status.341  For example, re-
garding the incident when he was 16 years old, Kimumwe had testified that the 
police officers had told him that they were arresting him for being gay, not for 
having sex.342  The dissent further emphasized the Zimbabwean government’s 
hostility toward homosexuals, including President Robert Mugabe’s declara-
tion that homosexuals were “sodomites and perverts” and “had ‘no rights at 
all.’”343  Thus, the dissent determined that no reasonable factfinder could adopt 
the IJ’s conclusion that Kimumwe had not suffered past persecution “based on 
his status as an openly gay man.”344 
Constitutional norms are potentially relevant here.  Analyzing the legiti-
macy of punishment for same-sex intimate conduct implicates the holding of 
Lawrence, namely, that criminal penalties for engaging in same-sex intimate 
relationships, and not merely for one’s “status” as a gay or lesbian person, vio-
late the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.345  Such punishment also 
contravenes Romer v. Evans, which held that a state constitutional amendment 
that prohibited anti-discrimination laws protecting gays and lesbians violated 
 
335. Id. at 320–21. 
336. Id. at 321. 
337. Id. 
338. Id. 
339. Id. at 323. 
340. Id. 




345. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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the Equal Protection Clause.346  Taken together, Lawrence and Romer stand for 
the proposition that “moral disapproval of [LGBT people] cannot be a legiti-
mate governmental interest.”347  This concept is relevant to understanding the 
harms created by homophobic laws or discriminatory enforcement against 
LGBT persons. 
Neither the majority nor the dissent in Kimumwe, however, considered 
these U.S. constitutional protections for sexual minorities.  Instead of invoking 
these norms as a benchmark for evaluating the importance of the rights at stake, 
the majority discounted country conditions evidence evincing state-sanctioned 
discrimination, harassment, and violence against sexual minorities in Zimba-
bwe and invoked the deference owed to the IJ’s factual determinations to con-
clude that Kimumwe had not suffered persecution on account of his member-
ship in a particular social group.348  On the Eighth Circuit’s reading, Kimumwe 
presents a case where the applicant was punished for engaging in sexual con-
duct that happened to occur between two males.349  This reading suggests that 
Kimumwe would have met the same fate had he engaged in sexual acts with a 
female, but country conditions evidence dramatically contradicts that view.350  
By failing to weigh the country conditions evidence fully and ignoring the Due 
Process and Equal Protection norms relevant to the issues, the court concluded 
that Kimumwe had not suffered persecution on account of a protected charac-
teristic.351 
A federal appeals court also ignored relevant constitutional principles in 
Fatin v. INS, a much older case involving an Iranian woman’s desire not to 
comply with a law requiring every woman to wear a veil, or chador, in public.352  
In Fatin, the petitioner, Parastoo Fatin, was an Iranian woman who had lived in 
the United States since the age of 18.353  Fatin had entered the United States as 
a student in 1978 and eventually applied for asylum, claiming that she feared 
persecution on account of her feminist political opinion and membership in a 
particular social group consisting of “upper class . . . Iranian women who sup-
 
346. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (“A State cannot so deem a class of persons a 
stranger to its laws.  Amendment 2 violates the Equal Protection Clause . . . .”). 
347. See Hazeldean, supra note 39, at 416 (quoting State v. Limon, 122 P.3d 22, 35 (Kan. 2005)). 
348. Kimumwe, 431 F.3d at 322–23 (majority opinion). 
349. Id. at 320–21. 
350. See id. at 322, 324–25. 
351. See id. at 325. 
352. Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1235 (3d Cir. 1993). 
353. Id. 
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ported the Shah of Iran, a group of educated Westernized free-thinking individ-
uals.”354  The BIA determined that Fatin would not be singled out and would, 
instead, be subject to the laws and regulations generally applicable to women 
in Iran.355  As a result, the BIA reasoned, Fatin would not suffer persecution on 
account of a protected characteristic.356 
On petition for review, the Third Circuit agreed.  In evaluating whether 
Fatin would face persecution in the form of Iranian laws based on repressive 
social norms, the court inquired whether these regulations would be enforced 
against Fatin based on her membership in a particular social group.357  The court 
determined that Fatin feared persecution on account of her membership in the 
particular social group of Iranian woman “who find [laws based on repressive 
social norms] so abhorrent that they ‘refuse to conform’ . . . ” despite the risk 
of severe punishment.358  However, the court determined that petitioner, accord-
ing to her testimony, was not actually a member of this group; that is, she would 
not find compliance “abhorrent.”359  The court reasoned that, because petitioner 
would rather conform than risk punishment, not wearing a veil was not such a 
deeply held belief; therefore, forcing petitioner to wear a veil was not persecu-
tion.360  On this logic, no one would ever qualify for asylum based on a claim 
that wearing the chador itself would amount to persecution, and the court would 
never have to opine on the severity of that harm.  By admitting that she would 
in fact wear the chador, as required, such a woman would reveal an intention 
to comply with the law and avoid punishment.361  This, in turn, would prove the 
woman is someone who does not find wearing the chador sufficiently abhorrent 
for the requirement to amount to persecution. 
Absent from the analysis is any reference to the First Amendment’s guar-
antee of freedom of expression, even though potential constitutional analogies 
abound, and the court alluded to U.S. constitutional standards.362  For example, 
in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, the Supreme 
Court held that a school regulation banning students from wearing black arm-
bands to protest America’s waging of the Vietnam War violated the First 
 
354. Id. at 1237. 
355. Id. 
356. See id. 
357. Id. at 1241. 
358. Id. 
359. Id. at 1242. 
360. See id. at 1241. 
361. Id. at 1241–42. 
362. Id. at 1240 (“[P]ersecution does not encompass all treatment that our society regards as 
unfair, unjust, or even unlawful or unconstitutional.”) (emphasis added). 
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Amendment rights of students.363  Although the justices disagreed about the 
nature of students’ rights to expression in a state-run school and the level of 
protection warranted, they accepted the proposition that wearing a black arm-
band was a form of political speech.364  The majority determined that such 
speech, even by students at a state-run school, was entitled to the highest levels 
of protection.365 
An analogy to Tinker or comparable precedent would have highlighted the 
political nature of the harm in Fatin—that a law prohibiting a manner of dress 
associated with a particular political viewpoint infringes on free political ex-
pression.  The armband ban at issue in Tinker amounted to viewpoint-based 
discrimination, as the armbands were associated with opposition to the Vietnam 
War, and the ban did not extend to all political viewpoints.366  The entire pur-
pose of the ban was to silence dissent due to a vague fear of unrest.367  Similarly, 
the requirement of wearing the chador amounted to a ban on any viewpoint 
except one that endorsed Khomeini and women’s invisibility in public.  Thus, 
in a sense, the chador requirement limited Iranian women’s ability to express 
opposition to repressive mores and also constituted a viewpoint-based re-
striction. 
None of this is to say that the Third Circuit should have applied U.S. con-
stitutional analysis to resolve Fatin’s asylum claim.  Instead, the court could 
have considered First Amendment jurisprudence as a point of comparison.  The 
Fatin court, however, declined to consider the chador law as an infringement 
on the right to political expression of Iranian women.368  It mostly avoided di-
rectly discussing the law itself and the harm it caused, namely that women were 
forced to wear clothes that expressed alignment with Khomeini or cooperation 
with repressive social mores.  The court instead focused on the supposed lack 
of vehemence in the applicant’s opposition to the law.369  The court also ulti-
mately alluded to a practical constraint on its judgment—the specter of millions 
 
363. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504–06 (1969). 
364. Id. at 505. 
365. Id. at 505–06. 
366. Id. at 510–11.  The Tinker majority noted that students were even permitted to wear political 
buttons or symbols of Nazism.  Id. at 510; see also Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S.Ct. 853 (2015) (holding that 
a prison’s grooming policy burdened a prisoner’s free exercise of religion by preventing him from 
growing his beard). 
367. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 510. 
368. See Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1241 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting poorly developed administrative 
record on treatment of women in Iran). 
369. Id. at 1242 (“[T]he petitioner’s testimony in this case simply does not show that for her the 
requirement of wearing the chador or complying with Iran’s other gender-specific laws would be so 
profoundly abhorrent that it could aptly be called persecution.”). 
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of women from around the world seeking asylum due to repressive laws in their 
home countries.370 
Considering constitutional norms in these cases would have led courts to 
offer a more complete and vivid assessment of the harms alleged.  The court in 
Fatin assumed that being forced to wear the veil could constitute persecution,371 
but it did not analyze what fundamental rights such a law would violate.  By 
avoiding that discussion, the court was able to move quickly into an analysis of 
whether the applicant truly abhorred the law or was merely displeased with it.372  
Similarly, in Kimumwe, the court failed to consider U.S. constitutional analo-
gies or analyze the legitimacy of Zimbabwe’s treatment of sexual minorities.373  
By focusing on the fiction that the same consequences would have befallen a 
man for sexual encounters with a woman as for encounters with another man, 
the court avoided discussing the right at stake.  Constitutional law can help 
frame the concepts of “persecution” and “nexus” to make them less foreign and 
more familiar to courts and litigants.374  For all of these reasons, courts should 
continue to use constitutional norms in asylum adjudications, but with greater 
clarity about the implications of the practice. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article exposes for the first time the federal courts’ surprising yet sen-
sible practice of using of U.S. constitutional norms in asylum adjudications.  It 
finds that federal courts treat foreign governments’ violations of U.S. constitu-
tional standards inconsistently when evaluating the merits of asylum claims.  In 
some cases, these violations are sufficient for granting asylum; in other cases, 
they are insufficient.  In some cases, these violations are necessary for asylum 
to be granted; in other cases, they are unnecessary.  Ultimately, through this 
 
370. See id. at 1240 (“If persecution were defined that expansively, a significant percentage of 
the world’s population would qualify for asylum in this country . . . .”). 
371. Id. at 1242 (“[W]e will assume . . . that the concept of persecution is broad enough to include 
governmental measures that compel an individual to engage in conduct that is not physically painful 
or harmful but is abhorrent to that individual’s deepest beliefs.”). 
372. Id. 
373. Kimumwe v. Gonzales, 431 F.3d 319, 322 (8th Cir. 2005). 
374. See Fatma Marouf, The Rising Bar for Persecution in Asylum Cases Involving Sexual and 
Reproductive Harm, 22 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 81, 161 (2011).  The question remains whether con-
stitutional law displaces important international human rights norms, and if so, whether such displace-
ment supports more carefully circumscribed use of constitutional norms in this context.  A full discus-
sion of the normative justification for using constitutional law in asylum cases is beyond the scope of 
this Article, but it is one of the current projects of the Author. 
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discussion, this Article reveals the “dual role”375 of constitutional norms in asy-
lum cases.  These norms both serve as doctrine to assist courts in gauging 
whether the harm alleged is sufficiently severe to amount to “persecution,” and 
help courts define key terms such as “political opinion.”376  In so doing, this 
Article contributes to a discussion of the diverse roles of constitutional law in 
asylum law and the relationship of the U.S. Constitution to international human 
rights law more generally.  The latter has implications for the position of this 
country in the world. 
 
 375.   E-mail from Hiroshi Motomura, UCLA School of Law, to author (July 3, 2016, 18:14 
EST) (on file with author). 
376. I thank Hiroshi Motomura for articulating this point. 
